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THE PHANTOM DEFENSE: 
THE UNAVAILABILITY OF THE 
ENTRAPMENT DEFENSE IN NEW YORK 
CITY “PLAIN VIEW” MARIJUANA 
ARRESTS 
Ari Rosmarin* 
INTRODUCTION 
New York City Police Department (“NYPD”) officers 
stopped a twenty-nine-year-old black truck driver leaving a 
Bronx housing project one evening. According to the man, 
[The officers] told me to show them if I had anything 
illegal. They said if I didn’t have much, there’d be no 
problem. So I took out the nickel bag and they arrested 
me. I said ‘Come on, I showed you everything I had,’ 
but they just put cuffs on me.1 
The man was arrested and charged with criminal possession of 
marijuana in the fifth degree under Section 221.10 of the New 
                                                          
* J.D. Candidate, Brooklyn Law School, 2013; B.A., Columbia College, 
Columbia University, 2006. Thanks are due to the Marijuana Arrest Research 
Project, the New York Civil Liberties Union, The Bronx Defenders, and 
other scholars and advocates for their foundational work bringing the scope 
of unjust New York City marijuana arrests to light. Special thanks also to 
R.R. for his support and editing eye, and the editors and staff of the Journal 
of Law and Policy for their input and suggestions. 
1 HARRY G. LEVINE & DEBORAH PETERSON SMALL, N.Y. CIVIL 
LIBERTIES UNION, MARIJUANA ARREST CRUSADE: RACIAL BIAS AND POLICE 
POLICY IN NEW YORK CITY 1997–2007, at 40 (2008), available at 
http://www.nyclu.org/files/MARIJUANA-ARREST-CRUSADE_Final.pdf. 
The facts of this arrest, though not extensive, will serve as the basis for 
further discussion in this Note of how such arrests fit within New York 
entrapment law. Id.; see also E-mail from Harry Levine to author (Oct. 6, 
2012, 14:07 EST) (on file with author). 
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York State Penal Law—possession in a public place burning or 
open to public view (“MPV”), a B misdemeanor.2 Had the 
marijuana remained in his pocket, however, prosecutors could 
have only charged the man with unlawful possession of 
marijuana under Section 221.05 of the penal law—a 
nonfingerprintable violation.3 Given the variance between the 
consequences of the two offenses, it is particularly troubling that 
criminal defense attorneys in New York City report that police 
make arrests such as this one with great frequency.4  
While attorneys and academics had been concerned about the 
unprecedented number of low-level marijuana arrests in New 
York City throughout the 1990s and early 2000s,5 the 
phenomenon was not comprehensively studied until 2008, when 
the New York Civil Liberties Union published a report, 
Marijuana Arrest Crusade: Racial Bias and Police Policy in New 
York City 1997–2007 (“Marijuana Arrest Crusade”), written by 
Harry G. Levine and Deborah Peterson Small.6 The report, which 
                                                          
2 N.Y. PENAL LAW § 221.10(1) (McKinney 2008). 
3 Id. § 221.05 (“Unlawful possession of marijuana is a violation 
punishable only by a fine . . . .”); N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 150.75 
(McKinney 2004) (“Whenever the defendant is arrested without a warrant, an 
appearance ticket shall promptly be issued and served upon him, as provided 
in this article.”). In limited cases, where the officer cannot determine the 
arrestee’s identity or residence address or reasonably believes the arrestee has 
provided a false identification or address, the officer may condition the 
issuance of the ticket on the arrestee posting pre-arraignment bail. Id.  
4 LEVINE & SMALL, supra note 1, at 41. 
5 See, e.g., Bernard E. Harcourt & Jens Ludwig, Reefer Madness: 
Broken Windows Policing and Misdemeanor Marijuana Arrests in New York 
City, 1989–2000, at 1 (John M. Olin Program in Law & Econ., Working 
Paper No. 317, 2006), available at http://www.law.uchicago.edu/files/ 
files/317.pdf (describing pattern of increased marijuana arrests beginning in 
1994); Kevin Flynn, Arrests Soar in Crackdown on Marijuana, N.Y. TIMES 
(Nov. 17, 1998), http://www.nytimes.com/1998/11/17/nyregion/arrests-soar-
in-crackdown-on-marijuana.html (quoting Legal Aid Society attorney Tony 
Elichter lamenting the arrest-to-arraignment practices involving marijuana 
arrestees). 
6 LEVINE & SMALL, supra note 1. Harry G. Levine is a professor of 
sociology at Queens College and the City University of New York Graduate 
Center. Deborah Peterson Small was the executive director of Break the 
Chains when the report was published. Id. at 106. 
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remains the most extensive analysis of the NYPD’s marijuana 
arrest practices, brought significant media and advocacy attention 
to the issue. Advocates used the occasion to designate New York 
City the “Marijuana Arrest Capital” of the world.7 
New York State’s current marijuana laws were enacted in 
1977, when the state legislature decriminalized possession of 
less than 25 grams of marijuana under the Marijuana Reform 
Act and removed marijuana from the definition of controlled 
substances.8 The Act sought to “reduce the penalties for 
possession and sale of marihuana and in particular to 
‘decriminalize’ the possession of a small amount of marihuana 
for personal use.”9 
Yet arrests for marijuana possession in New York City have 
exploded in the past fifteen years. In 2011 alone, the NYPD 
arrested 50,684 people for section 221.10 offenses—more arrests 
than the total number of such arrests between 1978 and 1996 
combined.10 Criminal possession of marijuana was the most 
common arrestable offense in 2011.11 This amounts to a 
                                                          
7 Associated Press, NYCLU: City Is World’s ‘Marijuana Arrest Capital,’ 
N.Y. SUN (Apr. 30, 2008), http://www.nysun.com/new-york/nyclu-city-is-
worlds-marijuana-arrest-capital/75535/. 
8 LEVINE & SMALL, supra note 1, at 60. 
9 People v. Allen, 92 N.Y.2d 378, 384 (1998) (quoting William C. 
Donnino, Practice Commentary, N.Y. PENAL LAW § 221.00 (McKinney 
2008)). 
10 Andy Newman, Marijuana Arrests Rose in 2011, Despite Police 
Directive, NYTIMES.COM (Feb. 1, 2012, 4:03 PM), http://cityroom.blogs. 
nytimes.com/2012/02/01/low-level-marijuana-arrests-rise-for-seventh-straight-
year/. The misdemeanor arrests referred to in this article are arrests under 
Penal Law section 221.10(1). In order for one to be convicted under section 
221.10, one must either possess marijuana in a public place (“MPV”), PENAL 
LAW § 221.10(1), or possess between 25 grams and 56.7 grams, or two 
ounces, of marijuana, id. § 221.10(2). According to the New York State 
Division of Criminal Justice Services, there were 50,676 section 221.10 
arrests in 2011, slightly fewer than the New York Times reports. See E-mail 
from N.Y. State Div. of Criminal Justice Servs., to author (July 27, 2012, 
14:02 EST) (on file with author). Of the 50,676 section 221.10 arrests, 
49,800 were for offenses under section 221.10(1), marijuana in view of the 
public. The remaining 876 arrests were for section 221.10(2) offenses, 
possession of marijuana between 25 and 56.7 grams. Id. 
11 Press Release, Drug Policy Alliance, New Data Released: NYPD 
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marijuana arrest approximately every ten minutes12 or one out of 
seven criminal cases in New York City’s courts.13 The 
significance of such statistics should not be underestimated; 
despite a statutory decriminalization policy, the NYPD under the 
Bloomberg administration made over 400,000 fifth degree 
criminal possession of marijuana arrests between 2002 and 
2011.14 These arrests have significant consequences for arrestees, 
impacting employment, immigration status, child custody, 
educational opportunities, and driving privileges, among other 
ramifications. 
Moreover, descriptions of police trickery in securing MPV 
arrests, such as the experience of the man in the Bronx 
recounted above, have become commonplace in major New 
York City mainstream media outlets.15 The problem has grown 
so large that NYPD Commissioner Raymond Kelly felt 
                                                          
Made More Marijuana Possession Arrests in 2011 than in 2010; Illegal 
Searches and Manufactured Misdemeanors Continue Despite Order by 
Commissioner Kelly to Halt Unlawful Arrests (Feb. 1, 2012), available at 
http://www.drugpolicy.org/news/2012/02/new-data-released-nypd-made-more 
-marijuana-possession-arrests-2011-2010-illegal-searche. In 2011, MPV 
arrests under section 221.10 were the top arraignment charge in New York 
City by at least 10,000 charges. OFFICE OF THE CRIMINAL COURT OF N.Y.C., 
ANNUAL REPORT 2011, at 30 (Justin Barry, ed. 2011) [hereinafter CRIMINAL 
COURT REPORT], available at http://www.courts.state.ny.us/courts/nyc/ 
criminal/AnnualReport2011.pdf. In 1995, the offense did not register in the 
top ten offenses citywide. Id. 
12 Jim Dwyer, Push for Marijuana Arrests in N.Y. Has Side Effects, 
N.Y. TIMES (June 17, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/06/17/nyregion/ 
push-for-marijuana-arrests-in-ny-has-side-effects.html.  
13 Jennifer Peltz, Pot Arrests Top 50K in 2011 Despite NYPD Order, 
YAHOO! NEWS (Feb. 1, 2012), http://news.yahoo.com/pot-arrests-top-50k-
2011-despite-nypd-order-182052393.html. 
14 Documenting New York City’s Marijuana Arrest Crusade, 
MARIJUANA-ARRESTS.COM, http://marijuana-arrests.com/nyc-pot-arrest-
docs.html (last visited July 15, 2012). 
15 See, e.g., Alisa Chang, Alleged Illegal Searches by NYPD Rarely 
Challenged in Marijuana Cases (WNYC radio broadcast Apr. 27, 2011), 
available at http://www.wnyc.org/articles/wnyc-news/2011/apr/27/alleged-
illegal-searches; Jim Dwyer, A Call to Shift Policy on Marijuana, N.Y. 
TIMES (June 15, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/06/15/nyregion/in-
new-york-a-call-to-shift-policy-on-marijuana.html; Newman, supra note 10; 
Peltz, supra note 13. 
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compelled to issue a special order in September 2011 reminding 
NYPD officers that directing an individual to display any 
marijuana he or she is carrying cannot create a chargeable MPV 
offense.16 The order reads in part: 
A crime will not be charged to an individual who is 
requested or compelled to engage in the behavior that 
results in the public display of marihuana. Such 
circumstances may constitute a violation of Penal Law 
section 221.05 – Unlawful Possession of Marihuana, a 
violation[,] not Penal Law section 221.10 (1) – Criminal 
Possession of Marihuana in the 5th Degree, a class B 
misdemeanor . . . . To support a charge of PL 221.10 
(1) the public display must be an activity undertaken of 
the subject’s own volition. Thus, uniformed members of 
the service lawfully exercising their police powers during 
a stop may not charge the individual with PL 221.10 (1) 
CPM 5th if the marihuana recovered was disclosed to 
public view at an officer’s direction.17 
While advocates of changes to NYPD marijuana policing 
cautiously praised the Commissioner’s order,18 and marijuana 
arrests slightly decreased in the months following its issuance,19 
                                                          
16 N.Y. POLICE DEP’T, OPERATIONS ORDER NO. 49, CHARGING 
STANDARDS FOR POSSESSION OF MARIHUANA IN A PUBLIC PLACE OPEN TO 
PUBLIC VIEW (2011) [hereinafter 2011 KELLY MEMO], available at 
http://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/252743/nypd-marijuana-order.pdf.  
17 Id. 
18 See, e.g., Donna Lieberman, Big Step Forward: NYPD Orders 
Officers to Stop Unlawful Marijuana Arrests, ACLU BLOG OF RIGHTS (Sept. 
26, 2011, 4:02 PM), http://www.aclu.org/blog/criminal-law-reform/big-step-
forward-nypd-orders-officers-stop-unlawful-marijuana-arrests (“While the new 
directive is an important step forward, it will have little impact unless the 
NYPD vigilantly enforces it.”); Press Release, Drug Policy Alliance, NYPD 
Commissioner Calls on NYPD to Stop Improper Marijuana Arrests (Sept. 23, 
2011), available at http://www.drugpolicy.org/news/2011/09/nypd-
commissioner-calls-nypd-stop-improper-marijuana-arrests (“This represents a 
tremendous victory. . . . But, the devil remains in the details.”); Editorial, 
Trouble with Marijuana Arrests, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 27, 2011), http://www. 
nytimes.com/2011/09/27/opinion/trouble-with-marijuana-arrests.html (“While 
the memo . . . is an important step, it does not by itself end the problem.”). 
19 See Edith Honan, Marijuana Arrests Fall in New York After Rule 
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recent evidence suggests the order has ultimately had little 
impact on marijuana arrest practices.20 
Even New York State Governor Andrew Cuomo 
acknowledged the impropriety of such arrests during the 2012 
state legislative session by unsuccessfully proposing legislation 
to change the penal code to address the vast number of 
marijuana arrests.21 Yet if knowledge of improper NYPD 
marijuana enforcement practices is so widespread, why do 
entrapment defenses fail to defeat MPV prosecutions in court?  
This Note examines NYPD marijuana enforcement practices 
in light of New York State’s entrapment law. It argues that 
although the NYPD appears to be in contravention of both the 
law and stated NYPD policy, entrapment defenses are still 
unavailable to many MPV defendants. Part I of this Note 
explores the causes of the substantial increase in MPV arrests 
since the mid-1990s. Part II details the significant consequences 
of misdemeanor marijuana arrests and convictions for New York 
City defendants. Part III examines New York State entrapment 
law as it applies to an emblematic MPV arrest, arguing that both 
traditional entrapment and entrapment by estoppel defenses 
should succeed in invalidating many MPV arrests. Part IV 
outlines the disincentives and obstacles to successfully arguing 
                                                          
Change, REUTERS (Dec. 7, 2011), http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/ 
12/07/us-newyork-arrests-marijuana-idUSTRE7B62GB20111207 (reporting a 
thirteen percent drop in New York City misdemeanor marijuana possession 
arrests in the nine weeks following the Commissioner’s order compared to 
the same nine-week period in 2010). 
20 Alice Brennan & Ryan Devereaux, New York Police Officers Defy 
Order to Cut Marijuana Arrests, GUARDIAN (London) (Mar. 30, 2012, 5:00 
PM), http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2012/mar/30/nypd-stop-and-frisk-
marijuana (“In September last year, [NYPD Commissioner Ray] Kelly issued 
an order to officers not to arrest people caught with small amounts of 
marijuana. But the number of those arrested increased after the order was 
made.”); see also infra Part V.A. 
21 See infra Part V.D.; see also Alisa Chang, Wading into Stop-and-Frisk 
Debate, Cuomo Pushes to Cut Pot Arrests, WNYC (June 4, 2012), 
http://www.wnyc.org/blogs/wnyc-news-blog/2012/jun/04/cuomo-wading-stop-
and-frisk-ask-reduced-pot-arrests/ (“‘[A] young person has a small amount of 
marijuana in their pocket, during the stop-and-frisk the police officer says 
turn out your pockets, the marijuana is now in public view. It just went from 
a violation to a crime,’ [Governor Cuomo] said.”). 
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entrapment defenses in MPV arrests in New York City, 
particularly logistical hurdles, court overcrowding, police 
corruption, and considerable evidentiary burdens. Finally, Part 
V explores the strengths and weaknesses of policy proposals to 
protect the rights of MPV defendants and limit police 
misconduct in this area. Ultimately, this Note asserts that 
changes to New York State’s marijuana laws are likely the most 
sustainable approach to reducing improper MPV arrests. 
I. EXAMINING THE INCREASE IN SECTION 221.10 MARIJUANA 
ARRESTS 
Given that there are now over 50,000 section 221.10 
marijuana arrests per year in New York City, scholars and 
commentators have proposed various hypotheses to explain the 
explosion in MPV arrests. While several of the theories are 
explored below, this Note contends that it is a combination of 
these factors that have aligned to create a perfect policy storm 
leading to such unprecedented arrest numbers.  
A. The Rise of “Broken Windows” Policing in New York City 
The dramatic increase in misdemeanor marijuana arrests in 
New York City from 12,800 in 1991–1995 to 147,000 in 1996–
2000 raises a fundamental inquiry into what changed in the mid-
1990s.22 The most common development scholars point to is the 
introduction of “order maintenance policing” in New York City 
in 1994.23 The philosophical manifesto of this policing strategy is 
“Broken Windows,” a 1982 Atlantic Magazine article by social 
scientists George Kelling and James Wilson.24 Kelling and 
                                                          
22 LEVINE & SMALL, supra note 1, at 7.  
23 See Amanda Geller & Jeffrey Fagan, Pot as Pretext: Marijuana, Race 
and the New Disorder in New York City Street Policing, 7 J. EMPIRICAL 
LEGAL STUD. 591, 592 (2010); Bruce D. Johnson et al., Policing and Social 
Control of Public Marijuana Use and Selling in New York City, 6 L. 
ENFORCEMENT EXECUTIVE F. 59, 66 (2006). 
24 George L. Kelling & James Q. Wilson, Broken Windows, ATLANTIC 
MAG., Mar. 1982, at 29, available at http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/ 
archive/1982/03/broken-windows/4465/. 
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Wilson argue that the aggressive policing of unruly, public 
behavior—“smoking, drinking, disorderly conduct, and the 
like”—will lead to a decrease in large-scale and violent crime.25  
In his 1993 mayoral race, Rudolph Giuliani built his 
platform upon the “broken windows” theory. He promised to 
crack down on low-level street crime, pollution, and noise to 
effectively translate Kelling and Wilson’s theory into practice.26 
Once in office, Giuliani tasked his newly appointed police 
commissioner, William J. Bratton, with the project of carrying 
out his campaign promises. Bratton responded with an array of 
policing reforms, including the introduction of the CompStat 
crime mapping system.27 The focus of Bratton’s strategy was 
proactive prosecution of “graffiti, aggressive panhandling, fare 
beating, public drunkenness, . . . public urination, and other 
low-level misdemeanor offenses.”28 While the NYPD did not 
explicitly identify marijuana possession in the context of its 
strategy to “reclaim the streets,”29 the numbers of low-level 
marijuana misdemeanor arrests sharply increased following the 
introduction of the Bratton’s new policing approach.30 
                                                          
25 Id. 
26 Giuliani has publicly identified Kelling and Wilson’s article as the 
source of his administration’s crime strategy. See Rudolph Giuliani Interview, 
ACAD. ACHIEVEMENT, http://www.achievement.org/autodoc/page/giu0int-4 
(last updated Apr. 17, 2008) (“I very much subscribe to the ‘Broken 
Windows’ theory, a theory that was developed by Professors Wilson and 
Kelling, 25 years ago maybe. The idea of it is that you had to pay attention 
to small things, otherwise they would get out of control and become much 
worse. . . . [W]e started paying attention to the things that were being 
ignored . . . . [T]he street-level drug dealing; the prostitution; the graffiti, all 
the things that were deteriorating the city.”). 
27 Geller & Fagan, supra note 23, at 594. CompStat is a large-scale 
computer system pioneered by the NYPD in 1994 that uses real-time statistical 
data to identify crime trends, allocate police resources geographically, and 
pursue accountability from precinct commanders by the NYPD leadership. See 
ARTHUR STORCH, WORLDWIDE LAW ENFORCEMENT CONSULTING GRP., INC., 
COMPSTAT—THE START OF A REVOLUTION IN POLICING (2006), available at 
http://www.wwlecg.com/docs/COMPSTAT%20article.pdf. 
28 Geller & Fagan, supra note 23, at 594. 
29 Id. 
30 See LEVINE & SMALL, supra note 1, at 8 (showing a significant increase 
in marijuana arrests beginning in the mid-1990s). 
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The focus on “Broken Windows” policing did not conclude at 
the end of the Giuliani administration in 2001. Shortly after the 
terror attacks of September 11th and days before his inauguration, 
Mayor-elect Michael Bloomberg emphasized his intention to 
continue the policing strategy of his predecessor and reemphasize 
a crackdown on “quality of life crimes.”31 The NYPD under 
Mayor Bloomberg has arrested more people for misdemeanor 
marijuana offenses than it did during Mayors Giuliani’s, David 
Dinkins’, and Ed Koch’s administrations, combined.32 
One of the central enforcement strategies of the Giuliani-
Bloomberg quality-of-life policing philosophy has been the 
expansion of the NYPD’s stop-and-frisk policy, which some 
commentators have identified as the source of increased MPV 
arrests.33 Generally, a stop-and-frisk encounter takes place when 
a police officer detains and questions an individual, then 
conducts a pat-down or “frisk”34 of the individual’s outer 
clothing or bags to identify dangerous weapons.35 While there is 
                                                          
31 Adam Nagourney, Quality of Life Is High Priority for Bloomberg, 
N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 27, 2001), http://www.nytimes.com/2001/12/27/nyregion/ 
quality-of-life-is-high-priority-for-bloomberg.html. 
32 Press Release, Drug Policy Alliance, 2010 NYC Marijuana Arrest 
Numbers Released: 50,383 New Yorkers Arrested for Possessing Small 
Amounts of Marijuana (Feb. 10, 2011), available at http://www.drugpolicy. 
org/news/2011/02/2010-nyc-marijuana-arrest-numbers-released-50383-new-
yorkers-arrested-possessing-small-. 
33 See, e.g., Geller & Fagan, supra note 23. In 2011, approximately 
30,000 of the over 50,000 section 221.10 marijuana arrests took place 
following NYPD street stops. See Brennan & Devereaux, supra note 20.   
34 During a frisk, “[t]he officer must feel with sensitive fingers every portion 
of the prisoner’s body. A thorough search must be made of the prisoner’s arms 
and armpits, waistline and back, the groin area and about the testicles, and entire 
surface of the legs down to the feet.” Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 17 n.13 (1968) 
(quoting L.L. Priar & T.F. Martin, Searching and Disarming Criminals, 45 J. 
CRIM. L. CRIMINOLOGY & POLICE SCI. 481, 481 (1954)). 
35 There does not appear to be an agreed-upon definition of a stop-and-
frisk encounter. The Supreme Court set forth its Fourth Amendment analysis 
for such encounters in Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. at 20–22. In New York, the 
Court of Appeals described and established a distinct, and somewhat more 
stringent, analysis of such encounters in People v. DeBour, 40 N.Y.2d 210, 
213, 215 (1976). This Note is not a constitutional analysis of NYPD stop-and-
frisk practices; others, however, have questioned whether the day-to-day reality 
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no singular blueprint for stop-and-frisks, they continue to be a 
core component of the expansion of order-maintenance policing 
in New York City.36 While in 1997 the NYPD reported 
conducting 85,768 stops,37 in 2011 the NYPD reported 685,724 
stops,38 an increase of nearly 700%. Often, these stops do not 
arise from a police officer’s reasonable suspicion that an 
individual possesses marijuana; rather, the police employ a 
range of permissible justifications for a search, such as 
observing “[f]urtive [m]ovements” or determining an individual 
“[f]its [the] [d]escription” of a suspect.39  
Though a stop-and-frisk is not always targeted at uncovering 
marijuana possession, such stops are frequently a starting point 
for MPV arrests. In 2011, approximately 30,000 of the 50,000 
arrests for possession of marijuana under section 221.10 took 
place following an NYPD street stop.40 Evidence suggests that 
stop-and-frisks result in MPV arrests in two different scenarios: 
                                                          
of NYPD stop-and-frisks fall within the permissible stop-and-frisk constitutional 
boundaries established in Terry and DeBour. See, e.g., CIVIL RIGHTS BUREAU, 
OFFICE OF THE N.Y. ATT’Y GEN., STOP-AND-FRISK REPORT 160–62 (1999), 
available at http://www.oag.state.ny.us/sites/default/files/pdfs/bureaus/civil_ 
rights/stp_frsk.pdf (explaining the varying reasons for stops and the applicable 
constitutional standards, such as reasonable suspicion); Geller & Fagan, supra 
note 23, at 614–18 (discussing the legality of stop-and-frisks dependent upon 
the circumstances and justifications involved in those stops). 
36 See CIVIL RIGHTS BUREAU, supra note 35, at 56–59 (noting the 
emphasis placed on stop-and-frisks in order-maintenance policing); Geller & 
Fagan, supra note 23, at 594–96 (describing the dramatic change in police 
strategy and tactics under the model of order maintenance). 
37 U.S. COMM’N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, POLICE PRACTICES AND CIVIL RIGHTS 
IN NEW YORK CITY, at ch.5, n.63 (2000), available at http://www.usccr.gov/ 
pubs/nypolice/ch5.htm.  
38 Julie Dressner & Edwin Martinez, Op-Ed., The Scars of Stop-and-
Frisk, N.Y. TIMES (June 12, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/06/12/ 
opinion/the-scars-of-stop-and-frisk.html.  
39  Geller & Fagan, supra note 23, app. at 632. NYPD officers are required to 
fill out a Stop, Question and Frisk Report Worksheet, or UF-250 form, 
indicating their reasons for detaining an individual, after each investigatory stop. 
For a copy of the UF-250, see Stipulation of Settlement at 8, Daniels v. New 
York, No. 99 Civ. 1695 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 24, 2003), available at 
http://ccrjustice.org/files/Daniels_ StipulationOfSettlement_12_03_0.pdf. 
40 See Brennan & Devereaux, supra note 20.  
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a police officer encourages, instructs, or orders a detained 
individual to produce any marijuana he or she might have on his 
or her person,41 or the officer reaches into an individual’s 
pocket, bag, or clothing and retrieves the marijuana.42 While the 
latter scenario has troubling Fourth Amendment implications,43 it 
is the former that raises specific entrapment concerns.44 Though 
                                                          
41 See, e.g., supra text accompanying notes 1–21; see also Chang, supra 
note 21 (reporting Governor Cuomo’s description of unlawful marijuana 
arrests where “the police officer says turn out your pockets” resulting in an 
MPV offense); Tom Hays, A Little Pot Is Trouble in NYC: 50k Busts a Year, 
WALL STREET J. (Nov. 5, 2011, 7:13 PM), http://online.wsj.com/article/ 
AP4e600773864942f98e92afaa1c6e89e9.html (describing Bronx community 
organizer Alfredo Carrasquillo’s MPV arrest before which an NYPD officer 
ordered him to “empty out his pockets” outside of his school). 
42 See, e.g., Marijuana Possession Arrests, Illegal Searches, and the 
Summons Court System: Hearing on Res. 986-2011 Before the Pub. Safety 
Comm., 2012 Leg., 2012 Sess. 25–37 (June 12, 2012) [hereinafter Levine 
Testimony] (statement of Harry G. Levine, Professor of Sociology, Queens 
Coll.), available at http://legistar.council.nyc.gov/View.ashx?M=F&ID= 
1965274&GUID=C07ECCDD-03B9-45D6-92C2-DC2E26CE2842 (“How do 
the police find a bit of marijuana, usually a few grams or less . . . or a thin 
marijuana cigarette, or even part of one? First of all, in the course of a pat 
down, or a frisk, an officer simply reaches into the person’s pockets.”); 
Verified Complaint at 17–22, Gomez-Garcia v. N.Y.C. Police Dep’t, No. 
451000-2012 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. June 22, 2012), available at http://www.legal-
aid.org/media/157211/06222012_marijuana_complaint.pdf (describing the 
MPV arrests of five plaintiffs who allege NYPD officers found small 
amounts of marijuana by searching their pockets or clothing); Alisa Chang, 
Marijuana Arrests Dip After NYPD Order, but Allegations of Improper 
Arrests Continue (WNYC radio broadcast Dec. 8, 2011), available at 
http://www.wnyc.org/blogs/wnyc-news-blog/2011/dec/08/marijana-numbers/ 
(describing the MPV arrest of a nineteen-year-old in which an NYPD officer 
shook arrestee’s sleeve until three bags of marijuana dropped out and the 
officer stuck his hand up the arrestee’s sleeve to retrieve a fourth bag). 
43 See Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40, 65 (1968) (holding that, absent 
a pat-down of the defendant’s outer clothing for weapons and feeling objects 
that reasonably might be weapons, police officer’s search of defendant’s 
pockets for drugs violates the Fourth Amendment).  
44 Liz Benjamin, Jeffries: Pot Arrests Are ‘Classic Entrapment,’ YNN 
STATE OF POLITICS BLOG (June 5, 2012, 12:00 PM), http://capitaltonightny. 
ynn.com/2012/06/jeffries-pot-arrests-are-classic-entrapment/comment-page-1/ 
(quoting New York State Assemblyman Hakeem Jeffries’s description of the 
scenario in which individuals who comply with a police demand to empty 
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the increase in stop-and-frisks is not likely the sole cause of 
increased MPV arrests, the dramatic uptick in stop-and-frisks 
closely correlates with the significant increase in such arrests 
and fits within the goals of the NYPD’s policing priorities since 
the mid-1990s.45 
B. Marijuana Enforcement Is a Means, Not an End:  
Building the NYPD’s Databases 
Another hypothesis for the dramatic increase in marijuana 
arrests is that such arrests are a means of database building: the 
more the NYPD make, the more names, photos, and fingerprints 
are collected in the Department’s computer system for use in 
solving past or future crimes.46 Information gathered from an 
arrest is retained and accessible to police via the NYPD’s Real 
Time Crime Center database.47 Although New York State law 
                                                          
their pockets and are then charged with criminal marijuana possession as 
“classic entrapment” (internal quotation marks omitted)).  
45 See LEVINE & SMALL, supra note 1, at 21–22. In 2012, New York 
Governor Andrew Cuomo proposed a change in the marijuana possession 
laws as a means of reducing the number of stop-and-frisks in New York City. 
Thomas Kaplan, Cuomo Seeks Cut in Frisk Arrests, N.Y. TIMES (June 3, 
2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/06/04/nyregion/cuomo-seeks-cut-in-
stop-and-frisk-arrests.html. 
46 LEVINE & SMALL, supra note 1, at 21–22. 
47 Solana Pyne, NYPD Unveils High-Tech Real Time Crime Center at 
Police Headquarters, NY1 (July 14, 2005, 6:31 PM), http://www.ny1.com/ 
content/top_stories/52142/nypd-unveils-high-tech-real-time-crime-center-at-
police-headquarters. Since 2009, there have been reports that this database 
would also include an arrested individual’s cell phone’s International Mobile 
Equipment Identity (IMEI) number or serial number. See Rocco Parascandola, 
NYPD Tracking Cell Phone Owners, but Foes Aren’t Sure Practice Is Legal, 
N.Y. DAILY NEWS (Oct. 8, 2009), http://www.nydailynews.com/news/ 
ny_crime/2009/10/08/2009-10-08_number_please_nypd_tracking_cell_phone_ 
owners_but_foes_arent_sure_practice_is_le.html. There have also been reports 
that arrested individuals’ personal markings like tattoos, birthmarks, scars, 
missing and gold teeth, limps, skin conditions, or any other details an officer 
decides to write down are saved in the database. See Michael S. Schmidt, 
Have a Tattoo or Walk With a Limp? The Police May Know, N.Y. TIMES 
(Feb. 18, 2010), http://www.nytimes.com/2010/02/18/nyregion/18tattoo.html. 
Most recently, beginning August 1, 2012, any person convicted of any 
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requires the sealing and destruction of certain information 
collected from arrestees whose cases are dropped, dismissed, or 
are acquitted,48 the NYPD admits it trains its officers to “take 
down as much [information] as they can.”49 As New York State 
law only specifically requires the destruction of photographs and 
fingerprints following a resolution in a defendant’s favor,50 some 
information the NYPD collects from arrestees is not required to 
be purged and may continue to be stored in NYPD databases.51 
The legality of such data collection and retention is unclear, but 
the NYPD argues the collection of identifying information is a 
legitimate part of its law enforcement strategy.52 
The NYPD has used street stops, arrests, and technology to 
enhance its data-collection efforts aggressively in the past two 
decades.53 This emphasis on data collection, while seemingly a 
                                                          
misdemeanor or felony, except for first-time offenders convicted of MPV 
offenses and youthful offenders, is required to submit to DNA collection. The 
NYS DNA Databank and CODIS, N.Y. STATE DIV. OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE 
SERVS., http://criminaljustice.state.ny.us/forensic/dnabrochure.htm (last 
visited Sept. 23, 2012). 
48 N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW §§ 160.50, 160.55 (McKinney 2004). 
49 Schmidt, supra note 47. 
50 CRIM. PROC. §§ 160.50, 160.55. 
51 For example, identifying information such as tattoos or other personal 
features are not listed as information to be destroyed or expunged in the event 
of a resolution of a criminal action or proceeding in favor of the defendant. 
Id. § 160.55. 
52 See Schmidt, supra note 47 (“Police officials said, however, that the 
database had helped identify people who were not carrying identification and 
that it had also had many successes catching criminals.”). 
53 See generally N.Y. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, WHO’S WATCHING? 
VIDEO CAMERA SURVEILLANCE IN NEW YORK CITY AND THE NEED FOR 
PUBLIC OVERSIGHT (2006), available at http://www.nyclu.org/files/ 
publications/nyclu_pub_whos_watching.pdf (reporting dramatic increase in 
surveillance cameras in NYC in 1990s and 2000s); see also Sean Gardiner, 
NYPD Adopts Eye-Scan Technology, WALL STREET J. (Nov. 15, 2010), 
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748703326204575617031249438
718.html (discussing the NYPD’s collection of iris data as part of the 
booking process); Paul Harris, NYPD and Microsoft Launch Advanced 
Citywide Surveillance System, GUARDIAN (London) (Aug. 8, 2012, 4:20 
PM), http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2012/aug/08/nypd-microsoft-
surveillance-system (“[The new system], which bears a passing resemblance 
to the futuristic hologram data screens used by Tom Cruise in the science 
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crime-solving strategy, may have also become itself an engine 
for arrests. Because the NYPD has the capacity to make MPV 
arrests so frequently and section 221.05, or “simple 
possession,” offenses are nonfingerprintable violations that do 
not lead to arrests, officers may have an incentive to make MPV 
arrests—even arrests that may not be entirely proper—to 
contribute information to the department’s growing databases.54 
C. It’s a Numbers Game: Bureaucracy, Quotas, and 
CompStat 
One of the most significant developments that emerged from 
the changes to NYPD strategy in the mid-1990s was the creation 
of the CompStat system. CompStat allows top NYPD 
commanders to make resource-allocation decisions based on 
real-time crime conditions and to evaluate their subordinate 
commanders based largely on productivity indicators: statistics 
on crime numbers, arrests, stops, and seizures, for example, 
mapped geographically.55 As CompStat was integrated into the 
NYPD structure, commanders faced constant pressure at weekly 
meetings with their superiors to show their crime numbers were 
low and arrest numbers were high.56 Precincts and individual 
                                                          
fiction film Minority Report, will allow police to quickly collate and visualise 
vast amounts of data from cameras, license plate readers, 911 calls, police 
databases and other sources”); Bob Hennelly, A Look Inside the NYPD 
Surveillance System (WNYC radio broadcast May 21, 2010), available at 
http://www.wnyc.org/articles/wnyc-news/2010/may/21/a-look-inside-the-nypd 
-surveillance-system/ (discussing the expansion of the NYPD’s Domain 
Awareness System); Bob Herbert, Big Brother in Blue, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 
12, 2010), http://www.nytimes.com/2010/03/13/opinion/13herbert.html 
(“Commissioner Kelly [is] collecting more information than J. Edgar Hoover 
could ever have imagined compiling.”). 
54 See Harry Levine et al., Drug Arrests and DNA: Building Jim Crow’s 
Database, COUNCIL FOR RESPONSIBLE GENETICS GENETIC WATCHDOG BLOG, 
http://www.councilforresponsiblegenetics.org/GeneWatch/GeneWatchPage.as
px?pageId=58&archive=yes (last visited Nov. 5, 2011). 
55 See John A. Eterno & Eli B. Silverman, The New York City Police 
Department’s Compstat: Dream or Nightmare?, 8 INT’L J. POLICE SCI. & 
MGMT. 218, 218–21 (2006). 
56 Id. at 223. 
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officers were praised or criticized by their supervisors partly 
based on their productivity numbers.57 Over time, this pressure 
on commanding officers has led to the emergence of what is, in 
effect, an arrest quota system within the NYPD.58 This is 
evidenced by tape recordings of precinct commanders’ roll call 
announcements ordering street-level officers to meet arrest and 
summons goals.59 
As MPV arrests are relatively straightforward,60 making 
routine misdemeanor marijuana arrests allows officers to show 
                                                          
57 See Daniel Edward Rosen, Is Ray Kelly’s NYPD Spinning Out of 
Control?, N.Y. OBSERVER (Nov. 1, 2011, 6:39 PM), http://observer.com/ 
2011/11/is-ray-kellys-nypd-spinning-out-of-control (“[A high-ranking officer 
explains: f]rom the borough command to the precincts, they put the pressure 
on officers to produce the numbers . . . . And [officers] stop people who 
don’t need to be stopped.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
58 Despite the NYPD’s denials of the existence of an arrest quota system, 
evidence continues to emerge that such practices may be commonplace 
throughout the department. See, e.g., Al Baker & Liz Robbins, A Quota by 
Any Other Name, NYTIMES.COM (Jan. 13, 2011, 11:32 AM), 
http://cityroom.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/01/13/a-quota-by-any-other-name/; Al 
Baker, Bronx Police Precinct Accused of Using Quota System, N.Y. TIMES 
(Feb. 23, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/02/24/nyregion/lawsuit-says-
bronx-police-precinct-uses-quota-system.html; Rocco Parascandola, NYPD Lt. 
Janice Williams Captured on Tape Pushing for More Busts, but Brass Says 
There’s No Quotas, N.Y. DAILY NEWS (Mar. 3, 2011), 
http://articles.nydailynews.com/2011-03-03/local/28666735_1_officer-adrian-
schoolcraft-illegal-quotas-nypd; Graham Rayman, Brooklyn Police Officer: 
Stop and Frisk Is Not About Racism, It’s About Quotas, RUNNIN’ SCARED 
(Jun. 15, 2012, 7:00 AM), http://blogs.villagevoice.com/runnin 
scared/2012/06/brooklyn_police.php; Graham Rayman, NYPD Quotas: 
Brooklyn Jury Says ‘Yes, Virginia, They Do Exist,’ RUNNIN’ SCARED (Feb. 
19, 2011, 1:49 PM), http://blogs.villagevoice.com/runninscared/2011/02/ 
nypd_quotas_bro.php [hereinafter Rayman, NYPD Quotas].  
59 See Graham Rayman, The NYPD Tapes: Inside Bed-Stuy’s 81st Precinct, 
VILLAGE VOICE (May 4, 2010), http://www.villagevoice.com/2010-05-
04/news/the-nypd-tapes-inside-bed-stuy-s-81st-precinct/ [hereinafter Rayman, 
NYPD Tapes]; see also Al Baker & Ray Rivera, Secret Tape Has Police 
Pressing Ticket Quotas, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 9, 2010), http://www.nytimes.com/ 
2010/09/10/nyregion/10quotas.html; Graham Rayman, Federal Judge: ‘NYPD 
Tapes’ Smoking Gun Evidence of Police Quotas, RUNNIN’ SCARED (Sept. 1, 
2011, 8:00 AM), http://blogs.villagevoice.com/runninscared/2011/09/federal_ 
judge_n.php. 
60 See LEVINE & SMALL, supra note 1, at 19 (“In our interviews, 
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high productivity with less of the risk associated with arrests for 
other offenses.61 Thus, officers are incentivized to pursue MPV 
arrests to meet the quotas assigned, formally or informally, by 
their commanding officers.62 
D. “Collars for Dollars”: NYPD Overtime Policies Drive 
Arrest Numbers 
A further explanation for the explosion in marijuana arrests 
focuses on the motivations of individual NYPD officers—easy 
MPV arrests can translate into significant overtime pay. Under 
NYPD overtime policies, officers that make arrests near the end 
of their shift are eligible for hours of overtime pay—at time and 
a half—for the booking process.63 This unofficial policy is even 
known in NYPD parlance as “collars for dollars.”64 Offenses 
involving marijuana possession are particularly conducive to 
end-of-shift arrests because they are clean, reliable, and easy to 
group in multiples.65 
                                                          
ordinary New York police officers report that making marijuana arrests is 
safer and eas[i]er than many other forms of police work.”).  
61 Peter Moskos, Collars for Dollars, REASON (July 2011), 
http://reason.com/archives/2011/06/29/collars-for-dollars (“When the murder 
rate was falling fastest in the 1990s, police never arrested more than a few 
thousand people per year for public-view marijuana. Only after the crime 
drop slowed did police turn to small-scale drug arrests to meet their 
‘productivity goals.’”).  
62 See Jim Hoffer, Investigation: Police Officer Quotas Revealed, 
(WABC television broadcast Mar. 3, 2010), available at 
http://abclocal.go.com/ 
wabc/story?section=news/investigators&id=7305356 (“[NYPD Officer Adil 
Polanco:] ‘At the end of the night you have to come back with something. 
You have to write somebody, you have to arrest somebody, even if the crime 
is not committed, the number’s there. So our choice is to come up with the 
number.’”). 
63 LEVINE & SMALL, supra note 1, at 20–21.  
64 Id. at 20. 
65 Id. at 19–20; Moskos, supra note 61 (“[Officers] are also influenced 
by what is known in New York as ‘collars for dollars’: Arrest numbers are 
influenced by incentive of overtime pay for finishing up paperwork and 
appearing in court.”). 
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While overtime pay is a well-documented motivating factor 
in police work,66 narcotics officers have received more 
opportunities for overtime than other officers when police 
leaders are focused on increasing arrest numbers.67 Beginning in 
early 2000, which remains the year with the highest marijuana 
arrest total on record,68 Police Commissioner Howard Safir and 
Mayor Giuliani ushered in Operation Condor, which focused on 
providing overtime to extra narcotics officers to make low-level 
drug arrests.69 Operation Condor officers worked on their days 
off to pursue low-level drug offenses, particularly marijuana 
offenses, leading to record numbers of marijuana arrests in the 
early 2000s.70 The initiative, which cost the NYPD $172 million 
in overtime costs and at its peak paid for an extra 1,000 officers 
on the street, was cut by Commissioner Kelly in 2002.71 
Operation Condor no longer exists but NYPD officers are still 
eligible for a certain number of overtime hours per month, 
although not as many as in earlier years.72 Furthermore, NYPD 
supervisors earn overtime pay when their subordinate officers 
do.73 This provides an incentive up and down the command 
structure to maximize opportunities for overtime and therefore to 
maximize arrests such as MPVs.74 
                                                          
66 See, e.g., EDITH LINN, ARREST DECISIONS 125 (2009) (“Officers 
postpone arrest-making until the end of the tour, which maximizes 
overtime.”). 
67 See, e.g., Larry Ceona & Andy Geller, Drug Cops Get More 
Overtime, N.Y. POST (Jan. 7, 2008), http://www.nypost.com/p/news/ 
regional/item_47zmaFKa2oJeIIO5MAE94J. 
68 LEVINE & SMALL, supra note 1, at 7. 
69 William K. Rashbaum, Eyeing Crime Rate, Police to Work Overtime on 
Drug Arrests, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 21, 2000), http://www.nytimes.com/2000/01/ 
21/nyregion/eyeing-crime-rate-police-to-work-overtime-on-drug-arrests.html. 
70 Geller & Fagan, supra note 23, at 595 n.2. 
71 William K. Rashbaum, Kelly Plans to Cut Money for Overtime Police 
Patrols, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 10, 2002), http://www.nytimes.com/2002/01/10/ 
nyregion/kelly-plans-to-cut-money-for-overtime-police-patrols.html. 
72 Johnson et al., supra note 23, at 70. 
73 LEVINE & SMALL, supra note 1, at 21 (“[S]upervisors also accumulate 
overtime pay when the officers working directly under them do.”). 
74 See id. 
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II. HIGH STAKES CONSEQUENCES OF MARIJUANA ARRESTS 
The stakes of the debate around the appropriateness of the 
NYPD’s marijuana enforcement policies are high. The tens of 
thousands of New York City residents arrested for marijuana 
offenses each year often face serious, long-term consequences, 
including loss of employment, eviction, and deportation, as a 
result of their arrests. And for those improperly arrested for 
MPV offenses that might otherwise be chargeable only as 
violations, or not chargeable at all, the implications can be 
devastating. 
These concerns motivated some members of the New York 
State legislature when they voted to pass the Marijuana Reform 
Act in 1977, decriminalizing possession of small amounts of 
marijuana.75 Discussions then focused on issues still relevant to 
New York City marijuana arrest policies today. For example, 
New York State Senator Abe Bernstein explained his vote in 
support of the Marijuana Reform Act on the floor of the Senate: 
“It is inequitable, unfair and even catastrophic for a youngster 
or young adult, because of a small quantity of marijuana in his 
possession, to run the risk of being arrested and being convicted 
and having a criminal record remain with him for the rest of his 
life.”76 Senator Bernstein’s words suggest that at least some in 
the legislature sought to divert arrestees with small amounts of 
marijuana away from the criminal justice system. However, 
current enforcement practices accomplish just the opposite: tens 
of thousands of individuals each year are shepherded through the 
arrest and arraignment process, leaving many with criminal 
records who might not otherwise have one.77 
The most immediate and universal consequence of 
misdemeanor marijuana arrests is the experience of the arrest to 
arraignment process itself. This procedure, which exposes 
marijuana arrestees to up to twenty-four hours in custody, and 
                                                          
75 Id. at 59. 
76 Id. at 60 (quoting Richard J. Meislin, Compromise Version of 
Marijuana Bill Approved in Albany; Governor Is Certain to Sign, N.Y. 
TIMES, June 29, 1977, at A1). 
77 See LEVINE & SMALL, supra note 1, at 50–52. 
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sometimes longer,78 often involves a full search or strip-search; 
photographing and fingerprinting; minimal access to toilets or 
hygiene facilities in dirty, crowded conditions; and overnight 
detention in the same cells as felony arrestees.79 But the 
detrimental effects of the arrest experience go beyond its mere 
unpleasantness. Levine and Small argue that arrests for 
marijuana possession “provide young Black and Latino men[80] 
with a head start in becoming clients of the criminal justice 
system by acclimating them to the humiliation and degradation 
of jail.”81 
                                                          
78 A 2006 study by the New York Civil Liberties Union found that 
thirty-six percent of arrestees over the study period in New York City were 
held longer than twenty-four hours before arraignment and a small number 
were held longer than thirty-six hours before arraignment. N.Y. CIVIL 
LIBERTIES UNION, JUSTICE DELAYED, JUSTICE DENIED 3, 6 (2006), available 
at http://www.nyclu.org/pdfs/cor_report_013106.pdf.  
79 K. Babe Howell, Broken Lives from Broken Windows: The Hidden 
Costs of Aggressive Order-Maintenance Policing, 33 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. 
CHANGE 271, 293–94 (2009). 
80 Much public attention on the NYPD’s marijuana arrest policies has 
focused on the racial disparity in marijuana arrests. For example, under 
Mayor Bloomberg’s administration, between 2002 and 2011, the New York 
State Division of Criminal Justice Services identified eighty-seven percent of 
arrestees under section 221.10 as Black or Latino and eleven percent as 
white. Documenting 10 Years of Marijuana Possession Arrests Under Mayor 
Bloomberg, MARIJUANA-ARRESTS.COM, http://marijuana-arrests.com/ 
graph8.html (last visited Aug. 14, 2012). Yet recent national surveys have 
indicated higher rates of reported marijuana usage among whites than blacks 
or Hispanics. See, e.g., Quick Tables, SUBSTANCE ABUSE & MENTAL 
HEALTH DATA ARCHIVE, http://www.icpsr.umich.edu/quicktables/ 
quicksetoptions.do?reportKey=32722-0001_all%3A7 (select “Race and 
Ethnicity” from “Respondent Characteristics” drop-down menu; then click 
“Create the Table” button) (finding 45.9% of whites, 40.7% of blacks, and 
30.6% of Hispanics have ever used marijuana). While the racial disparity in 
marijuana arrests is significant and should be subject to critical scrutiny, such 
analysis is not within the scope of this Note. For a deeper analysis of the role 
of race in New York City marijuana arrests, see Geller & Fagan, supra note 
23, at 596; Andrew Golub et al., The Race/Ethnicity Disparity in 
Misdemeanor Marijuana Arrests in New York City, 6 CRIMINOL. & PUB. POL. 
131 (2007). 
81 LEVINE & SMALL, supra note 1, at 51. 
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Arrestees also face negative consequences in the area of 
employment. For example, many arrestees lose their jobs for 
missing work as a result of the often-lengthy arraignment wait 
times or because their employers do not want to retain an 
employee associated with drug offenses.82 In addition, a 
misdemeanor conviction can also automatically bar a defendant 
from access to employment in certain state-licensed professions, 
such as security guards. More informally, employers may 
discriminate against job applicants with an arrest record,83 
evidence of which may be accessible via commercial databases.84 
City agencies, such as the New York City Housing Authority 
(NYCHA), are also notified when an employee is arrested, 
putting those individuals’ jobs in jeopardy.85 
Arrests can also result in significant housing consequences. 
Under federal law, individuals in New York City arrested for 
marijuana possession and their families can be evicted from 
                                                          
82 Dwyer, supra note 12.  
83 See EQUAL EMP’T OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, NO. 915.002, 
ENFORCEMENT GUIDANCE: CONSIDERATION OF ARREST AND CONVICTION 
RECORDS IN EMPLOYMENT DECISIONS UNDER TITLE VII OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS 
ACT OF 1964, at 12 (2012), available at 2012 WL 1499883 (recognizing 
problem of employment discrimination against individuals with arrest 
records). 
84 See Howell, supra note 79, at 304–06. Some defendants may be 
eligible for certificates of relief from disabilities from New York State that 
can help to lift or mitigate some employment bars. See N.Y. CORRECT. LAW 
§ 701 (McKinney 2003); see also Summary of Collateral Consequences in 
Employment, FOUR CS, http://blogs.law.columbia.edu/4cs/employment/ 
summary/ (last updated Nov. 6, 2008) [hereinafter FOUR CS]. 
85 See N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 9 § 6051.1(a)(5) (2012); 
MCGREGOR SMYTH, THE BRONX DEFENDERS, THE CONSEQUENCES OF 
CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS IN NEW YORK STATE 11 (2010), available at 
http://www.nlada.org/DMS/Documents/1100886992.2/Consequences%20of%
20Criminal%20Proceedings_Oct04.pdf; Dwyer, supra note 12. In New York 
State, a misdemeanor conviction or guilty plea cannot be sealed and will 
remain public information indefinitely. FOUR CS, supra note 84. In contrast 
to a conviction or guilty plea for an MPV charge (section 221.10(1)), a 
conviction or guilty plea to unlawful possession of marijuana (section 221.05) 
is a violation and can be sealed after three years if the only substance 
involved is marijuana. N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 160.50(3)(k) (McKinney 
2004). 
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NYCHA housing as a result of their arrests.86 Significantly, 
eviction is not reserved for those convicted of an MPV offense; 
the law permits NYCHA to evict tenants based solely on a drug-
related arrest.87 An eviction for drug activity can result in a 
three-year ban on eligibility for federally assisted housing unless 
the person can demonstrate sufficient “rehabilitation,”88 such as 
completion of a drug treatment program, to the housing agency. 
Arrestees who do not live in public housing may also face 
eviction as a result of a marijuana arrest.89 
Misdemeanor marijuana convictions under section 221.10(1) 
can also result in dramatic immigration consequences. Under 
federal immigration laws passed in the mid-1990s, legal 
permanent residents who are convicted of two simple marijuana 
possession offenses are subject to deportation.90 Furthermore, 
conviction of a marijuana offense can also be grounds for 
inadmissibility for noncitizens seeking lawful status in the United 
                                                          
86 Under federal law, “any drug-related criminal activity on or off 
[public housing premises] . . . by any member of [a] tenant’s household, or 
any guest or other person under the tenant’s control, shall be cause for 
termination of tenancy.” 42 U.S.C. § 1437d(l)(6) (2011); see also Dep’t of 
Hous. & Urban Dev. v. Rucker, 535 U.S. 125, 130 (2002) (holding that, 
under federal law, local public housing authorities can “evict tenants for the 
drug-related activity of household members and guests whether or not the 
tenant knew, or should have known, about the activity”). 
87 CORINNE CAREY, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, NO SECOND CHANCE: 
PEOPLE WITH CRIMINAL RECORDS DENIED ACCESS TO PUBLIC HOUSING 1 
(2004), available at http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/usa1104.pdf. 
88 42 U.S.C. § 13661(a). 
89 See Scott Duffield Levy, Note, The Collateral Consequences of 
Seeking Order Through Disorder: New York’s Narcotics Eviction Program, 
43 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 539 (discussing New York City drug-related 
evictions effected through the auspices of the Narcotics Eviction Program). 
90 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(B)(ii) (2011). Although the Supreme Court 
decided in 2010 that two minor drug offenses do not necessarily constitute an 
“aggravated felony” under the immigration law and cancellation of removal is 
not necessarily unavailable to a respondent convicted of such offenses, that 
respondent will still be subject to removal proceedings as a result of the 
conviction. See Carachuri-Rosendo v. Holder, 130 S. Ct. 2577, 2580 (2010). 
210 JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY 
States91 and may subject those eligible for removal to mandatory 
detention pending deportation.92 
An MPV arrest can also have destructive consequences for 
familial integrity. New York State child welfare law includes in 
its definition of “neglected” children a child whose parent 
“misus[es] a drug or drugs” or “repeatedly misuse[s] a drug or 
drugs.”93 In practice, New York City’s Administration for 
Children’s Services regularly removes children from parents 
arrested for marijuana possession.94 The City brought hundreds 
of such cases against parents in recent years and defense lawyers 
report that more than ninety percent of neglect cases involving 
drugs include marijuana use.95 Moreover, an individual need not 
be convicted of a marijuana offense to face neglect charges; an 
arrest or even suggestion to a child welfare worker about 
marijuana use suffices.96 
Arrestees convicted of an MPV offense may also face the 
revocation of important privileges and benefits. For example, 
New York’s Vehicle and Traffic law mandates a six-month 
suspension of a state driver’s license when an individual is 
convicted of a misdemeanor marijuana offense.97 Furthermore, 
under the federal Higher Education Act, students receiving 
federal grants, loans, or work-study aid are ineligible to 
continue receiving that assistance if convicted of any drug 
possession offense.98 
                                                          
91 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2)(A)(i)(II). 
92 Id. § 1226(c). 
93 N.Y. SOC. SERV. LAW § 371(4-a)(i)(B) (McKinney 2010). If a parent 
is in a rehabilitation program, the law does not consider a child neglected 
unless there is evidence of a child’s imminent physical, mental, or emotional 
impairment. Id. 
94 See Mosi Secret, No Cause for Marijuana Case, but Enough for Child 
Neglect, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 17, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/08/18/ 
nyregion/parents-minor-marijuana-arrests-lead-to-child-neglect-cases.html.  
95 Id.  
96 Id.  
97 N.Y. VEH. & TRAF. LAW § 510(2)(b)(v) (McKinney 2011). 
98 20 U.S.C. § 1091(r)(1) (2011). For a single offense, aid is suspended 
for one year; for a second offense, aid is suspended for two years; for a third 
offense, aid is suspended indefinitely. Id. Under the law, a student whose 
eligibility for federal aid has been suspended can regain the aid before the 
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The consequences of the tens of thousands of misdemeanor 
marijuana arrests each year99 should not be underestimated. 
Although prosecutors offer most first-time misdemeanor MPV 
arrestees an adjournment in contemplation of dismissal 
(“ACD”)100 and New York State law provides for sealing the 
record of an ACD if the defendant does not offend for a period 
of up to a year,101 an ACD can still result in grave ramifications, 
including some of the employment and child custody 
consequences discussed above.102 As part of the ACD offer, 
prosecutors may also require that marijuana defendants complete 
a community service requirement or other sanctions that may 
result in an individual missing days at his or her place of 
employment.103  
Even though an MPV offense is the lowest-level 
misdemeanor chargeable under New York State’s marijuana 
laws, the consequences for MPV defendants upon conviction—or 
in some cases, even upon arrest—are profound. The 
ramifications of police misconduct in this context extend far 
beyond concerns over the integrity of the NYPD and the wisdom 
of broken windows policing; the harm to individual arrestees is 
tremendous. 
                                                          
full suspension period if the student completes a drug rehabilitation program 
and passes two unannounced drug tests. Id. § 1091(r)(2). As most of the 
people arrested in New York City for marijuana offenses are males under age 
twenty-six from low-income neighborhoods, ineligibility for federal financial 
aid could place significant, if not insurmountable, barriers in the way of these 
men pursuing college-level education. LEVINE & SMALL, supra note 1, at 8.  
99 Newman, supra note 10.  
100 LEVINE & SMALL, supra note 1, at 35. An ACD allows a court, upon 
motion of the defendant prior to pleading guilty, to suspend the criminal 
action against the defendant for a period of time during which the court may 
set conditions for adjournment. If the defendant violates those conditions, the 
court may revoke the suspension and recommence the prosecution. If the 
defendant adheres to the conditions for the set period of time, the court 
dismisses the criminal action in furtherance of justice, and the records of the 
arrest and prosecution are sealed. See N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 170.56 
(McKinney 2007). 
101 CRIM. PROC. § 170.56. 
102 Howell, supra note 79, at 304–06. 
103 Id. at 295 n.122. 
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III. ENTRAPMENT ANALYSIS 
A. Emptying Pockets: How a Marijuana Possession Violation 
Turns Into a Misdemeanor Crime 
Nearly all of the misdemeanor marijuana arrests in New 
York City take place under the MPV statute, yet, in reality, 
many of these arrests do not involve marijuana actually found in 
view of the public.104 Levine and Small estimate that between 
two-thirds and three-quarters of MPV arrestees are not found 
smoking in public and do not possess marijuana in view of the 
public when they are arrested.105 A 2012 study by The Bronx 
Defenders found a smaller percentage of improper MPV arrests 
than Levine and Small found; however, the study still reported 
that more than forty percent of all MPV arrests involve 
constitutional or evidentiary problems.106 Media reports have also 
                                                          
104 LEVINE & SMALL, supra note 1, at 39.  
105 Id. Research on how people possess and consume marijuana indicates 
the unlikelihood of so many individuals possessing or smoking marijuana in 
public. According to one survey, following years of aggressive marijuana 
enforcement in the mid-1990s, most MPV arrestees knew the NYPD were 
targeting public consumption and virtually all marijuana users knew the 
NYPD were actively searching for and arresting people for misdemeanor 
marijuana offenses. Johnson et al., supra note 23, at 76. While other 
research does suggest that a sizeable portion of marijuana smokers admit to 
smoking in the presence of police, nearly two-thirds report avoiding smoking 
in the presence of police. Bruce D. Johnson et al., Civic Norms and 
Etiquettes Regarding Marijuana Use in Public Settings in New York City, 43 
SUBSTANCE USE & MISUSE 895, 905 (2008). Because of the absence of 
nonanecdotal data on what proportion of MPV arrests came as a result of a 
stop-and-frisk or what proportion came from public smoking, there is no 
effective method of comparing public smoking habits with arrest data. 
However, the repeated testimony of criminal defense attorneys, defendants, 
police officers, and prosecutors should be sufficient to raise important doubts 
about the authenticity of the tens of thousands of MPV arrests each year. 
106 Press Release, The Bronx Defenders, The Bronx Defenders Marijuana 
Arrest Project Announces Preliminary Data Reflecting Ongoing and Systemic 
Constitutional and Evidentiary Problems in Marijuana Arrests by NYPD 
(Apr. 2, 2012) [hereinafter Bronx Defenders Press Release], available at 
http://www.bronxdefenders.org/press/bronx-defenders-marijuana-arrest-
project-announces-preliminary-review-data-reflecting-ongoing- (finding in 212 
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revealed that many arrests under the MPV statute may not, in 
fact, be based on a police officer’s observation of burning 
marijuana or marijuana in view of the public.107 
Rather, anecdotal research suggests that at the time of arrest, 
“most people who did possess marijuana had it concealed, 
hidden in their clothing and belongings.”108 MPV defendants are 
typically young African-American or Latino men who are 
approached by a police officer on the street and searched109 or 
who are prompted by a police officer to empty their pockets or 
bag.”110 Unfortunately, because so few misdemeanor marijuana 
arrests reach trial, there is no systemic record keeping of arrest 
facts beyond anecdotal evidence.111 
In one publicly reported incident, a Latino man in Manhattan 
Criminal Court reported being pulled over in his vehicle by an 
unmarked police car.112 The officer approached and told him, “‘I 
saw you walking from that building, I know you bought weed, 
give me the weed. . . . Give me the weed now and I will give 
you a summons, or we can search your vehicle and take you 
                                                          
of over 500 arrests studied, the police lacked legal cause for initial detention 
of the arrestee or police manufactured misdemeanor charges by causing 
marijuana to come into public view). 
107 See Chang, supra note 15 (“WNYC tracked down more than a dozen 
men arrested after a stop-and-frisk for allegedly displaying marijuana in 
public view. Each person said the marijuana was hidden—in a pocket, in a 
sock, a shoe, or in underwear.”). 
108 LEVINE & SMALL, supra note 1, at 42.  
109 See Chang, supra note 15. 
110 See LEVINE & SMALL, supra note 1, at 38–44.  
111 See infra Part IV.A (discussing barriers to MPV defendants reaching 
trial). While the issue of improper marijuana arrests has become a 
mainstream media story, the details of arrests similar to the example of the 
Bronx man remain difficult to identify. Much of the reporting on New York 
City marijuana arrests featuring arrestees have tended to focus on the 
problem of police officers improperly searching individuals’ pockets or bags. 
See, e.g., Chang, supra note 15; Wendy Ruderman & Joseph Goldstein, 
Lawsuit Accuses Police of Ignoring Directive on Marijuana Arrests, 
NYTIMES.COM (June 22, 2012, 5:40 PM), http://cityroom.blogs.nytimes. 
com/2012/06/22/in-lawsuit-police-officers-are-accused-of-ignoring-directive-
on-marijuana-arrests/.  
112 Jim Dwyer, On Arrests, Demographics, and Marijuana, N.Y. TIMES 
(Apr. 30, 2008), http://www.nytimes.com/2008/04/30/nyregion/30about.html.  
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in.’”113 After taking out his marijuana and giving it to the officer, 
he was handcuffed and arrested for possession of marijuana “open 
to public view.”114 The man put it succinctly, “‘I was duped.’”115 
To get a better sense of the frequency of these arrests, public 
defender organizations have begun assessing circumstances 
surrounding their clients’ arrests, with a particular focus on 
improper police tactics.116 However, beyond the rare situations in 
which an arrestee shares his or her personal story with a 
researcher, arrestees have little incentive to publicize their 
arrests.117 The lack of comprehensive data further compounds 
problems surrounding questionable MPV arrests. 
B. Traditional Entrapment Law 
The arrest of the man in the Bronx housing project raises a 
number of fairness concerns.  But does it constitute entrapment 
in New York State? The facts of the Bronx defendant allow for 
an analysis of the applicability of New York State entrapment 
law to MPV arrests generally. 
New York State’s entrapment law reads: 
In any prosecution for an offense, it is an affirmative 
defense that the defendant engaged in the proscribed 
conduct because he was induced or encouraged to do so 
by a public servant . . . seeking to obtain evidence 
against him for purpose of criminal prosecution, and 
                                                          
113 Id. 
114 Id. 
115 Id. 
116 See Steven Banks, Testimony [of] The Legal Aid Society in Support of 
Res. 986-A, in N.Y.C. COUNCIL, HEARING TESTIMONY, Res. 986-2011, 2012 
Leg., 2012 Sess., at 11–24 (June 12, 2012), available at 
http://legistar.council.nyc.gov/View.ashx?M=F&ID=1965274&GUID=C07
ECCDD-03B9-45D6-92C2-DC2E26CE2842; Bronx Defenders Press Release, 
supra note 106. 
117 Publicity of a marijuana arrest, even without conviction, can have 
significant consequences for arrestees. For example, a marijuana arrest itself 
can be cause for New York City’s Administration for Children’s Services to 
make a finding of neglect and remove a child from a parent. See Secret, 
supra note 94. 
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when the methods used to obtain such evidence were 
such as to create a substantial risk that the offense would 
be committed by a person not otherwise disposed to 
commit it. Inducement or encouragement to commit an 
offense means active inducement or encouragement. 
Conduct merely affording a person an opportunity to 
commit an offense does not constitute entrapment.118 
The New York Court of Appeals has held that the defendant 
bears the “burden of establishing entrapment by a preponderance 
of the evidence.”119 The defendant must demonstrate that “(1) he 
was actively induced or encouraged to commit the offense by a 
public official; and (2) such inducement or encouragement 
created a ‘substantial risk’ that the offense would be committed 
by defendant who was not otherwise disposed to commit it.”120 
1. Inducement 
Courts have not established a clear standard as to what 
conduct constitutes inducement.121 Generally, entrapment 
defenses arise in the context of undercover or sting operations, 
so the facts of the Bronx arrest, which involved a uniformed 
officer, are not a traditional fit.122 Although the details of the 
Bronx arrest provided here are admittedly limited, they are 
sufficient to reveal that the Bronx defendant did not appear to 
have any prior intention of removing the bag of marijuana from 
his person or bag until told to do so by the officers.123 
In People v. Brown, the New York Court of Appeals laid out 
additional parameters for inducement, noting that “merely asking 
                                                          
118 N.Y. PENAL LAW § 40.05 (McKinney 2009). 
119 People v. Brown, 82 N.Y.2d 869, 871 (1993).  
120 Id. 
121 See Paul Marcus, Proving Entrapment Under the Predisposition Test, 
14 AM. J. CRIM. L. 53, 58 (1987) (“The principal problem in this area arises 
with defining what is sufficient government conduct to constitute 
inducement . . . .”). 
122 Dru Stevenson, Entrapment by Numbers, 16 U. FLA. J.L. & PUB. 
POL’Y 1, 7 (2005) (“[Entrapment] is entirely a function of undercover 
operations.”). 
123 See LEVINE & SMALL, supra note 1, at 40. 
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a defendant to commit a crime is not such inducement or 
encouragement as to constitute entrapment.”124 In Brown, an 
undercover agent posing as a prostitute on a street corner asked 
Brown whether he wanted oral sex for twenty-five dollars. 
Brown had pulled his car up to the officer and answered 
affirmatively when the officer asked him if he was looking for a 
date.125 After Brown accepted the undercover officer’s offer, the 
police arrested him for patronizing a prostitute.126 The Court 
held that the officer’s proposition to Brown was “insufficient to 
warrant an entrapment charge” because the officer was “merely 
asking [Brown] to commit a crime.”127 
While the undercover officer’s conduct in Brown did not rise 
to the level of inducement necessary for an entrapment defense, 
the defendant in the Bronx hypothetical has a stronger case for 
arguing inducement. Here, the officer gave the defendant a 
direct instruction to reveal the marijuana,128 which constitutes 
significantly greater pressure than asking an individual to do 
something. Furthermore, such an instruction did not merely 
“afford . . . an opportunity” for the Bronx man to remove the 
marijuana on his own volition; rather, the officer’s command 
interrupted the man’s otherwise ordinary course of conduct, 
creating more than a “substantial risk” the man would commit 
the crime. The police officer’s instruction created a significant 
likelihood that the man would commit the crime unless he was 
willing to explicitly disobey police instructions. Absent 
additional evidence indicating the defendant planned to expose 
the marijuana of his own volition, the drugs would have 
remained concealed but for the officer’s instruction.129 A direct 
                                                          
124 Brown, 82 N.Y.2d at 872. Interestingly, NYPD Police Commissioner 
Ray Kelly’s Operations Order No. 49 states, “[a] crime will not be charged 
to an individual who is requested or compelled to engage in the behavior that 
results in the public display of marihuana.” 2011 KELLY MEMO, supra note 
16 (emphasis added). 
125 Brown, 82 N.Y.2d at 871. 
126 Id.  
127 Id. at 872. 
128 LEVINE & SMALL, supra note 1, at 40 (“They told me to show them if 
I had anything illegal.”). 
129 Anecdotally, a variant of the Bronx hypothetical exists in which 
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order from a uniformed police officer to a detained individual to 
take specific action is likely sufficient encouragement to meet 
the first prong of the entrapment burden.130 
2. Predisposition 
Once a defendant has established inducement by a 
preponderance of the evidence, the evidentiary burden shifts to 
the prosecution to rebut by proving beyond a reasonable doubt 
that the defendant was predisposed to commit the crime.131 In 
Sorrells v. United States, the Supreme Court held that an 
individual is not predisposed to commit a crime when 
government officials “implant in the mind of an innocent person 
the disposition to commit the alleged offense and induce its 
commission in order that they may prosecute.”132 The New York 
State Supreme Court, Appellate Division has indicated that 
predisposition “refers to the state of mind of a defendant before 
government officials make any suggestion that he should commit 
                                                          
individuals stopped by police officers voluntarily hand over a small amount of 
marijuana they are carrying without being instructed or asked to do so by an 
officer hoping that cooperation will earn them some leniency. LEVINE & 
SMALL, supra note 1, at 94 n.79. In such a case, it is unlikely that, absent 
additional evidence, being stopped by a uniformed police officer without a 
direction to turn over contraband or to empty one’s pockets is sufficient 
pressure to satisfy the inducement element of entrapment. See People v. 
Minckler, 695 N.Y.S.2d 843, 843 (App. Div. 1999) (quoting Brown, 82 
N.Y.2d at 871) (“[M]erely afford[ing] defendant an opportunity to commit 
the offense . . . is [not ]sufficient to warrant an entrapment charge.”).  
130 See Brown, 82 N.Y.2d at 871; People v. Butts, 72 N.Y.2d 746, 750 
(1988) (“When determining whether to give a charge on a claimed defense, 
the trial court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the 
defendant.”). 
131 People v. Chambers, 56 Misc. 2d 683, 686 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1968). 
132 Sorrells v. United States, 287 U.S. 435, 442 (1932). The drafters of 
New York’s entrapment statute wrote the law to comport with the Supreme 
Court’s entrapment formulation in Sorrells. William C. Donnino, Entrapment 
Practice Commentary, in MCKINNEY’S CONSOLIDATED LAWS OF NEW YORK 
(2009) (quoting STAFF NOTES OF THE COMMISSION ON REVISION OF THE 
PENAL LAW, PROPOSED NEW YORK PENAL LAW, MCKINNEY’S SPECIAL 
PAMPHLET 321 (1964)). 
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a crime.”133 In addition to introducing details surrounding the 
circumstances of the arrest, the prosecution is entitled to 
introduce evidence of a defendant’s criminal history to prove 
predisposition.134  
While the criminal history of the Bronx defendant is 
unknown, past convictions are not dispositive in determining 
predisposition.135 Absent additional compelling facts, presence in 
or near a Bronx public housing complex does not indicate a 
predisposition to possess or smoke marijuana in view of the 
public.136 While the defendant did possess marijuana in violation 
of section 221.05, he did not exhibit behavior suggesting he 
intended to publicly display it.137 There is no indication that the 
defendant was of a state of mind to commit the crime before the 
officer told him to show the officer if he had “anything 
illegal.”138 The evidence suggests the officer’s direction itself 
created the defendant’s mens rea139 and encouraged him to bring 
the marijuana into public view.140 
                                                          
133 People v. Torres, 185 A.D.2d 257, 259 (N.Y. App. Div. 1992). 
134 People v. Calvano, 30 N.Y.2d 199, 204 (1972) (“[P]roof of the 
criminal disposition of a defendant claiming entrapment is relevant generally 
. . . .”); Chambers, 56 Misc. at 685 (“The subject of the defendants’ past 
criminal record . . . is relevant on this point of predisposition.”). 
135 Calvano, 30 N.Y.2d at 204 (summarizing Sherman v. United States, 
356 U.S. 369, 375 (1958) (“[A] nine-year-old sales conviction and a five-
year-old possession conviction are insufficient to prove petitioner had a 
readiness to sell narcotics at the time [the government informant] approached 
him.”)). 
136 Because there is no indication the man went to the housing project with 
the intent to publicly display his marijuana, a reasonable fact-finder could 
conclude that he had no predisposition to commit the MPV offense. See Pinter 
v. City of New York, 710 F. Supp. 2d 408, 435 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (“[S]imilar 
to [the district attorney’s] conclusion that [the defendant] likely did not go to 
[the video store] with the intent to solicit money for sex, a reasonable jury 
could conclude that [the defendant] had no predisposition to commit 
prostitution.”). 
137 See LEVINE & SMALL, supra note 1, at 40.  
138 Id. 
139 Mens rea is the “state of mind that the prosecution, to secure a 
conviction, must prove that a defendant had when committing a crime . . . .” 
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 455 (3d pocket ed. 1996). 
140 Psychological research has demonstrated that when someone wearing 
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C. Entrapment by Estoppel 
Although the defendant in the Bronx arrest likely has a 
strong traditional entrapment law argument, alternatively, he 
may be able to avail himself of the entrapment by estoppel 
defense.141 
Entrapment by estoppel is a defense distinct from traditional 
entrapment that focuses on a defendant’s reasonable reliance on 
official representations in committing an offense.142 In United 
States v. George, the Second Circuit held that the affirmative 
defense of entrapment by estoppel “bars conviction of a 
defendant whose commission of a crime results from 
government solicitation, so long as the defendant reasonably 
believes that government agents authorized him to commit the 
criminal act.”143 The Sixth Circuit has identified four elements in 
a successful entrapment by estoppel defense: “(1) a government 
                                                          
what appears to be a police uniform instructs an individual to do something, 
the individual follows that instruction with a high rate of cooperation. 
Richard R. Johnson, The Psychological Influence of the Police Uniform, FBI 
L. ENFORCEMENT BULL., Mar. 2001, at 27, 28–29 (describing psychology 
experiment where researcher dressed in police uniform and ordered passers 
by to pick something up or give something to another person, resulting in 
high rate of cooperation from citizens in comparison to other types of 
uniforms).  
141 See 21 AM. JUR. 2D Criminal Law § 204 (2012). 
142 Id. 
143 United States v. George, 386 F.3d 383, 399 (2d Cir. 2004) 
(Sotomayor, J.) (quoting United States v. Abcasis, 45 F.3d 39, 42 (2d Cir. 
1995)); see also United States v. Nichols, 21 F.3d 1016 (10th Cir. 1994); 
United States v. Weitzenhoff, 35 F.3d 1275, 1290 (9th Cir. 1993); United 
States v. Smith, 940 F.2d 710 (1st Cir. 1991). Without naming it so, the 
Supreme Court has recognized the defense of entrapment by estoppel in three 
prominent cases. United States v. Pa. Indus. Chem. Corp., 411 U.S. 655, 
675 (1973) (finding that the district court erred in not allowing defendant to 
present evidence that it had been “affirmatively misled” into believing that its 
actions adhered to statutory law); Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 559, 571 
(1965) (finding that protestors justifiably relied on assurances by police that 
they were not violating the law); Raley v. Ohio, 360 U.S. 423, 425–26 
(1959) (finding unconstitutional “an indefensible sort of entrapment by the 
State—convicting a citizen for exercising a privilege which the State had 
clearly told him was available to him”). 
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must have announced that the charged criminal act was legal; (2) 
the defendant relied on the government announcement; (3) the 
defendant’s reliance was reasonable; and (4) given the 
defendant’s reliance, the prosecution would be unfair.”144 
Even in its most common application in the context of 
regulatory crimes like firearms licensing violations, the 
entrapment by estoppel defense is not frequently argued 
successfully.145 However, the scenario created by MPV arrests 
like the Bronx hypothetical creates an opportunity for New York 
defense attorneys—and courts—to expand recognition of this 
defense.  
In examining the elements, the first is arguably the most 
difficult in a successful entrapment by estoppel defense. 
According to the Bronx defendant, the police officer told him 
that if he showed what he had and it was not much, “there’d be 
no problem.”146 While the officer did not specifically tell the 
defendant that taking it out would be lawful, the officer did 
affirmatively tell him there would be “no problem,” which a 
reasonable person could arguably interpret to mean there would 
be no problem in violation of the law.147  
Second, the Bronx defendant’s reaction to being placed in 
handcuffs following his display of marijuana—“I said ‘Come on, 
I showed you everything I had,’ but they just put cuffs on 
me”148—suggests that he relied on the officer’s word that there 
would not be a problem and was surprised that he was arrested 
for following the officer’s instructions.  
Third, one’s reliance on an officer’s direct word that there 
will be no problem if marijuana is shown is reasonable.149 
                                                          
144 United States v. Levin, 973 F.2d 463, 468 (6th Cir. 1992).  
145 Stevenson, supra note 122, at 55–56. 
146 LEVINE & SMALL, supra note 1, at 40.  
147 Id.  
148 Id.  
149 See Margaret Raymond, The Right to Refuse and the Obligation to 
Comply: Challenging the Gamesmanship Model of Criminal Procedure, 54 
BUFF. L. REV. 1483, 1491 (2007) (“Most people do not, in fact, feel free to 
walk away when a police officer has asked them a question or otherwise 
indicated a desire for their cooperation, whether those views are motivated by 
fear of the consequences, by simple good manners, or by an internal 
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Choosing not to follow the officer’s instruction would have 
required the defendant to disobey a police direction, which is not 
reasonable to expect of the public.150 
The fourth element addresses the fairness of prosecution 
given a defendant’s reliance. The legislature’s decision to 
separate MPV offenses from simple possession offenses indicates 
the intent to exclude simple possession offenses from the 
criminal offense category.151 Accordingly, criminal prosecution 
of those defendants for activity that, absent police instructions, 
would fall squarely within the lower violation offense—section 
221.05—is counterintuitive and offends basic notions of 
justice.152 
                                                          
psychological compulsion to obey the direction of authority figures.”). In the 
constitutional seizure context, courts have found police orders to remove 
one’s hands from one’s pockets, to exit a vehicle, or go to somewhere one 
does not otherwise intend to go, as seizures. See id. at 1493. While 
entrapment analysis is separate from a Fourth Amendment seizure analysis, 
courts’ assessment of the reasonableness of following a police instruction in 
the seizure context is instructive. In the seizure context, a police request of 
an individual is not a seizure. See id. at 1494 n.13 (citing People v. Lawes, 
790 N.Y.S.2d 481, 482 (App. Div. 2005) (finding plainclothes officers’ 
request of defendant to accompany them to precinct for investigatory 
questioning was not a seizure)). 
150 See Raymond, supra note 149 at 1491. 
151 LEVINE & SMALL, supra note 1, at 60 (quoting Meislin, supra note 76). 
152 It is important to note that questions concerning whether evidence meets 
the evidentiary burdens for inducement and predisposition under traditional 
entrapment are traditionally questions for the jury. People v. Chambers, 56 
Misc. 2d 683, 686 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1968). In addition, questions about whether 
official conduct amounted to entrapment by estoppel are also traditionally 
questions for the jury. See Mark S. Cohen, Entrapment by Estoppel, 31 
COLO. LAW. 45, 48 (2002) (“Where a defendant alleges facts sufficient to 
make out a prima facie case for entrapment by estoppel, the majority of courts 
hold that the defendant is entitled to a jury trial.”). However, New York State 
law mandates that trials for B misdemeanors in New York City criminal courts, 
which provide for a sentence of less than six months, such as those under 
section 221.10(1), take place before a single judge. N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 
340.40(2) (McKinney 2005). The impact of New York’s bench trial 
requirement for 221.10(1) offenses on traditional jury-based entrapment fact 
finding is beyond the scope of this Note but is an important area to be 
examined. 
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Although typically entrapment by estoppel cases involve 
challenges to unintentional official actions,153 NYPD practices 
that have led to tens of thousands of MPV arrests each year 
indicate that the arrest strategy is deliberate.154 Despite this, the 
entrapment by estoppel defense —while presently marginal at the 
state and federal levels155—is a close fit for improper MPV 
arrests.156 When compliance with police instructions is the 
driving factor behind an individual’s arrest, this goes to the core 
of what the entrapment defense is designed to protect against.157 
                                                          
153 Stevenson, supra note 122, at 55. 
154 Even following a directive from NYPD Police Commissioner Ray 
Kelly in September 2011 to officers to halt practices that direct individuals to 
remove marijuana from their person in order to bring the marijuana into view 
of the public, the practice persists. See Peltz, supra note 13 (stating officers 
are still conducting stop-and-frisks and making arrests after searching 
people’s pockets or bags, or “inducing them to bring the pot into the open” 
though according to state law the drugs have to be in open view for an 
officer to make an arrest). 
155 See Stevenson, supra note 122, at 61–62 (suggesting a small number 
of such cases each year nationwide). 
156 Notwithstanding the obstacles to bringing challenges to MPV arrests 
to court, see infra Part IV, advancing entrapment by estoppel arguments in 
New York State in MPV cases when the opportunity presents itself would be 
an innovative tactic for defense lawyers seeking to set helpful precedent for 
future MPV cases. 
157 Another applicable entrapment theory may come from the sentencing 
entrapment defense. The Eighth Circuit has defined sentencing entrapment as 
when “a defendant although predisposed to commit a minor or lesser offense, 
is entrapped in committing a greater offense subject to greater punishment.” 
United States v. Stuart, 923 F.2d 607, 614 (8th Cir. 1991). Cases arguing 
sentencing entrapment have tended to involve the Federal Sentencing 
Guidelines and undercover agents’ strategic efforts to secure more severe 
sentences under the guidelines. See generally Kristin Kerr O’Connor, Note, 
Sentencing Entrapment and the Undue Influence Enhancement, 86 N.Y.U. L. 
REV. 609 (2011) (discussing the debate over internet stings to catch sexual 
predators and efforts to induce sentence-enhancing behavior in potential 
defendants). As most MPV arrestees are violating the law by virtue of simple 
possession, see N.Y. PENAL LAW § 221.05 (McKinney 2008), NYPD 
officers’ attempts to encourage individuals to bring the marijuana into public 
view could be a deliberate effort to cajole unknowing defendants into activity 
that meets the requirements for the arrestable B misdemeanor. Absent specific 
facts, there is a strong argument to be made for extending sentencing 
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IV. THE PHANTOM DEFENSE: ENTRAPMENT AS AN ILLUSION 
While it appears that under New York State law NYPD 
officers may in fact be “entrapping” many MPV arrestees, the 
operational reality of the New York City criminal justice system 
undermines the availability of an entrapment defense in most 
MPV cases. Considering the hundreds of thousands of MPV 
arrests in New York City over the past decade,158 one might 
expect the Court of Appeals to have ruled on the applicability of 
the entrapment defense in this context. However, because very 
few section 221.10(1) defendants ever reach trial, there are no 
such landmark New York State court decisions. The 
combination of procedural roadblocks associated with litigating a 
low-level misdemeanor charge, the pressure on defendants to 
plead, and the credibility challenges posed when defendants and 
police officers offer incompatible arrest accounts, may explain 
the absence of entrapment challenges to MPV arrest cases. 
A. Mission Impossible: Obstacles to Having One’s Day in 
Court 
Observers of the New York City criminal court system report 
that very few misdemeanor cases ever make it to trial.159 In 2000, 
there were 51,500 MPV arrests in New York City160 and six 
reached trial (with three acquittals).161 In 2011, at least twenty-one 
out of 49,800 arrests for section 221.10(1) reached trial (with 
                                                          
entrapment law to the MPV context. The bulk of litigation on sentencing 
manipulation has taken place in the federal courts, and the Supreme Court 
has yet to address the issue. O’Connor, supra, at 622. Depending on how 
and when the Supreme Court rules on the issue, this may be an area for 
exploration in New York courts in the future. 
158 Documenting New York City’s Marijuana Arrest Crusade, 
MARIJUANA-ARRESTS.COM, http://marijuana-arrests.com/nyc-pot-arrest-
docs.html (last visited Sept. 23, 2012) (reporting over 400,000 misdemeanor 
marijuana arrests between 2002 and 2011). 
159 In 2003, the misdemeanor trial rate in New York City was less than 
one-third of one percent. Steven Zeidman, Policing the Police: The Role of 
Courts and the Prosecution, 32 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 315, 321 n.35 (2005).  
160 LEVINE & SMALL, supra note 1, at 7.  
161 Howell, supra note 79, at 299 n.142. 
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nine acquittals).162 An analysis of these figures raises the question: 
what prevents MPV defendants from having their day in court? 
Explanations for why so few MPV or other misdemeanor 
arrests reach trial implicate many institutional components of the 
modern criminal justice system, including police officers, 
prosecutors, defense attorneys, judges, and existing New York 
State criminal procedure law. In practice, nearly all first-time 
MPV defendants accept a prosecutor’s offer of an ACD.163 Why 
might a defendant who believes he or she is not guilty agree to 
an ACD for an MPV arrest? To start, the structure of the New 
York’s criminal justice system encourages such defendants to 
move through and out of the system with as little delay as 
possible.164 Levine and Small describe the combination of “police 
searches, court procedures, plea deals, delay tactics, and 
strategic dismissals” as a “hermetically sealed system” that 
effectively denies such defendants their day in court.165 
The misdemeanor arraignment process in New York City 
rarely allows for a hearing on the merits.166 According to K. 
Babe Howell, a former New York City criminal defense 
attorney and a criminal justice legal scholar,167 defense attorneys, 
overburdened by juggling hundreds of cases at a time,168 
                                                          
162 See E-mail from N.Y. State Div. of Criminal Justice Servs., supra note 10. 
163 LEVINE & SMALL, supra note 1, at 35.  
164 See id. at 35–36.  
165 Id.  
166 See Ian Weinstein, The Adjudication of Minor Offenses in New York 
City, 31 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1157, 1173 (2004) (“The transaction costs 
associated with reaching the merits of the case are so high compared to the 
marginal value of exercising one’s rights, that it hardly ever makes sense to 
try a case in Manhattan Criminal Court.”). 
167 K. Babe Howell, CUNY SCH. OF LAW, http://www.law.cuny.edu/ 
faculty-staff/howell.html (last visited Sept. 23, 2012). 
168 See Howell, supra note 79, at 294. Under a state law passed in 2009 
and new rule issued by New York’s Chief Administrative Judge in 2010, 
public defenders’ caseloads will be limited to 400 misdemeanors or 150 
felonies beginning in 2014. Press Release, Legal Aid Society, The Legal Aid 
Society Receives Bi-Partisan Support at City Council Budget Hearing; 
Criminal Case Caps Announced by State Court Administrators (Mar. 11, 
2010), available at http://www.legal-aid.org/en/mediaandpublicinformation/ 
inthenews/criminalcasecapsannouncedbystatecourtadministrators.aspx.  
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regularly meet clients in a holding pen and interview five to ten 
clients per hour. The attorneys “often spend[] no more than 
three minutes telling a defendant who is there on a first arrest 
that he or she will be out shortly, will have to stay out of 
trouble, and may have to do community service.”169 Howell 
argues that competent representation in light of the collateral 
consequences of noncriminal dispositions (such as an ACD) is 
not possible in so short a time period.170 Presumably, most 
defense attorneys represent their clients to the best of their 
abilities. However, the pressure to expeditiously process minor 
arrestees has become routine and the adversarial model often 
morphs into one of administrative efficiency.171 
Likewise, prosecutors often offer plea deals or alternative 
dispositions without knowledge of the facts, available evidence, 
or any mitigating circumstances of a case.172 Prosecutors may 
also put pressure on defendants to take a plea bargain by holding 
out the prospect of immediate release in exchange for accepting 
a deal.173 Like defense attorneys, prosecutors have few incentives 
to challenge a scheme in which they can process defendants 
through the system relatively cleanly and efficiently.174 
Judges also bear much of the responsibility for the present 
state of misdemeanor adjudication.175 Lower court judges have 
                                                          
169 Howell, supra note 79, at 294 n.118; see also NAT’L ASS’N OF 
CRIMINAL DEF. ATT’YS, MINOR CRIMES, MASSIVE WASTE: THE TERRIBLE 
TOLL OF AMERICA’S BROKEN MISDEMEANOR COURTS 31 (2009), available at 
http://www.nacdl.org/public.nsf/defenseupdates/misdemeanor/$FILE/Report.
pdf (describing situation in many jurisdictions where defense attorneys 
“ha[ve] mere minutes to handle each case”). 
170 Howell, supra note 79, at 295. 
171 Zeidman, supra note 159, at 338. 
172 Weinstein, supra note 166, at 1181. 
173 NAT’L ASS’N OF CRIMINAL DEF. ATT’YS, supra note 169, at 33.  
174 Weinstein, supra note 166, at 1181. 
175 See Russell Engler, And Justice for All—Including the Unrepresented 
Poor: Revisiting the Roles of the Judges, Mediators, and Clerks, 67 
FORDHAM L. REV. 1987, 2028 (1999) (“The judge bears the heavy 
responsibility for presiding over a fair proceeding, which includes not only 
what occurs at trial itself, but outcomes produced by the more common result 
of settlement.” (citations omitted) (quoting Oko v. Rogers, 466 N.E.2d 661 
(Ill. App. Ct. 1984)) (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
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presided over the mechanization of the misdemeanor processing 
system and have a responsibility to be the agents of change 
when justice is not being served in their courtrooms.176 In some 
cases, judges simply accept the status quo of rushed defense 
counsel–client meetings and perfunctory prosecutors’ plea 
offers.177 In other cases, judges play a much more active role by 
effectively coercing defendants into pleading guilty, withdrawing 
plea offers if a defendant insists on a suppression hearing, or by 
issuing a harsher sentence if a defendant insists on trial and is 
convicted.178 While judges are not immune to the bureaucratic 
incentives that lead prosecutors and defense attorneys to abandon 
a robust adversarial process, the role of judges as overseers of 
the justice system demands a greater resistance to the “plea 
bargain mill” system.179 
Ultimately, the pressures on defendants of a criminal justice 
system that often emphasizes efficiency over justice and in some 
cases penalizes those who seek to exercise their rights180 works 
to prevent many defendants accused of low-level misdemeanors, 
like MPV arrestees, from pursuing their day in court. 
B. Not Even the Strong Survive: The Long and Winding Road 
to Trial 
Even for those defendants who manage to withstand the 
significant pressure to accept a plea bargain after a day or night 
                                                          
176 See Zeidman, supra note 159, at 333 (“Judges should refrain from 
sacrificing the truth-seeking function of the hearing at the altar of judicial 
expediency and economy.”). 
177 Howell, supra note 79, at 314.  
178 Zeidman, supra note 159, at 332; see generally Richard Klein, Due 
Process Denied: Judicial Coercion in the Plea Bargaining Process, 32 
HOFSTRA L. REV. 1349 (2004) (detailing judges’ roles in pressuring defendants 
to accept plea deals in jurisdictions across the United States, including New 
York). 
179 Zeidman, supra note 159, at 339.  
180 See NAT’L ASS’N OF CRIMINAL DEF. ATT’YS, supra note 169 at 33 
(explaining that prosecutors offer defendants more favorable plea bargains at 
the first court appearance only if they plead guilty that day).  
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in jail, defending against the state’s charges in court remains an 
elusive goal and may not be a worthwhile pursuit.181  
Perhaps the most practical—and most onerous—obstacle to a 
hearing on the merits is the time commitment required of a 
defendant to contest the charge.182 Typically, after arraignment, a 
defendant must return to court three to six times before any 
factual record is developed in the case.183 Then, an additional 
two to six appearances may be required before actually reaching 
trial.184 The reasons for each of these appearances are varied and 
can be the result of genuine process or scheduling challenges, 
unavailable witnesses, or unprepared prosecutors or defense 
attorneys.185 Each appearance usually requires the defendant to 
be present in court for a few hours, if not a full day.186 In 
practice, simply trying to defend oneself in court from a section 
221.10(1) misdemeanor marijuana possession offense could cost 
a defendant between five and twelve days of missed work187 over 
the course of a year or longer.188 Even for a determined 
defendant assured of her innocence with the evidence to support 
her, the costs demanded of such a defendant to reach a trial may 
simply be too great. 
Even for those MPV defendants who are determined to meet 
all of their required court appearances, with defense attorneys 
prepared to pursue an aggressive defense, the law may still 
prevent many defendants from reaching a hearing on the merits 
of their case. New York State’s speedy trial law formally 
                                                          
181 Weinstein, supra note 166, at 1173. 
182 LEVINE & SMALL, supra note 1, at 35–36. 
183 Weinstein, supra note 166, at 1172. This record is usually created at a 
suppression hearing. Id. 
184 Id. 
185 Howell, supra note 79, at 298–299. For descriptions of this Sisyphean 
process, see id.; Weinstein, supra note 166, at 1172. 
186 Howell, supra note 79, at 298; see also Weinstein, supra note 166, at 
1172. 
187 See Weinstein, supra note 166, at 1172. 
188 In 2010, the mean time between arraignment and a disposition at a 
bench trial was approximately 338 days. CRIMINAL COURT REPORT, supra 
note 11, at 53 (“Each court appearance requires a trip to the courthouse and 
between one and five hours waiting time in the courtroom.”). 
228 JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY 
requires that charges against defendants accused of MPV 
offenses be dismissed upon motion from defense counsel if the 
prosecution is unprepared for trial within sixty days.189 While 
there may be valid reasons or legitimate court congestion 
preventing trial from commencing within the statutorily required 
period,190 it is not uncommon for misdemeanor arrestees who 
decide not to accept a plea bargain to see their cases dismissed 
for failing to meet the speedy trial requirement.191 Though the 
speedy trial requirement ensures the efficient administration of 
justice, it can also disincentivize a defendant from arguing the 
merits of his or her defense at trial because filing a successful 
motion to dismiss based on a speedy trial violation terminates 
the defendant’s interaction with the criminal justice system.192 
Because prosecutors may not have strong evidence in MPV 
arrests, particularly in cases involving questionable police 
conduct, the speedy trial requirement can work to filter out 
some bad arrests.193 While the speedy trial requirement may be 
important for promoting efficiency—often to the benefit of all 
parties to a criminal matter—the ability of defendants to 
challenge improper policing tactics may suffer. 
Furthermore, some MPV cases may not reach trial because 
prosecutors may dismiss MPV charges against defendants who 
                                                          
189 The sixty-day rule applies to misdemeanor offenses for which the 
potential sentence is not more than three months. N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 
30.30(1)(c) (McKinney 2003). The maximum sentence for criminal 
possession of marijuana in the fifth degree (MPV) is ninety days. N.Y. 
PENAL LAW § 70.15(2) (McKinney 2009). 
190 See CRIM. PROC. §§ 30.30(3)(b), 30.30(4). 
191 See Howell, supra note 79, at 313 n.219; Weinstein, supra note 166, 
at 1169. 
192 See Howell, supra note 79, at 313 (“After multiple appearances, most 
defendants who initially wanted a trial will either accept a disposition or their 
cases will be dismissed based on speedy trial grounds . . . . As the system 
works now, the innocent do not have a chance to obtain public 
vindication . . . .”). 
193 Weinstein, supra note 166, at 1169 (“In a minor case, a police officer 
who mishandled a street encounter may simply not cooperate with a junior 
Assistant District Attorney, knowing that the case will likely be pled out or 
be dismissed for [a speedy trial violation]. It is a common and unremarkable 
occurrence.”). 
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have strong defenses or suppression arguments.194 Defendants 
who insist on going to trial in spite of the practical hurdles to 
doing so may have stronger arguments on the merits than the 
typical case.195 If a defendant has a strong case, prosecutors may 
be less likely to expend energy and resources on an MPV 
prosecution, and arresting police officers may be less likely to 
participate if a trial would raise questions as to the quality and 
integrity of the NYPD’s marijuana arrest policy tactics.196  
Ultimately both structural obstacles and the disincentives of 
all parties to an MPV prosecution to proceed to trial contribute 
to preventing many MPV arrestees from challenging their arrests 
in court. 
C. Challenges to Proving Entrapment: Preponderance of the 
Evidence and Police ‘Testilying’ 
Even if a defendant charged with an MPV misdemeanor 
manages to reach a trial—an exceedingly difficult thing to do—
the obstacles to successfully arguing an entrapment defense 
remain great. 
The burden of proving entrapment by a “preponderance of 
the evidence” falls on the defendant.197 In most cases, such a 
burden is onerous to meet without sufficient witness testimony 
or material evidence to present.198 This burden is particularly 
                                                          
194 See, e.g., LEVINE & SMALL, supra note 1, at 35–36 (“If the person 
continues to shows [sic] up and is always in court when his name is called, and 
especially if he has witnesses, eventually the prosecutor will probably drop the 
charges . . . . As one veteran attorney explained to us, ‘nobody, not the DA’s 
office, not the judges, and certainly not the police, wants to deal with a possible 
illegal search in a misdemeanor.’”); Howell, supra note 79, at 313 
(“Defendants may . . . demand a trial and expect a dismissal if they can 
make multiple court appearances for months or years.”); Weinstein, supra 
note 166, at 1168 (“The cases involving the clearest problems may end up 
being declined or dismissed.”). 
195 LEVINE & SMALL, supra note 1, at 35–36. 
196 See id. 
197 N.Y. PENAL LAW § 25.00(2) (McKinney 2009). 
198 People v. Pilgrim, 545 N.Y.S.2d 794, 796 (App. Div. 1989) (“There 
must be more than ‘some evidence’ of inducement or encouragement and of 
overzealous or pressure methods by the police . . . .”). 
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difficult in MPV arrest cases where there are generally not many 
witnesses to the stop or search and arrest besides the defendant 
and the officer.199 Police officers will often write on their arrest 
reports and subsequently testify that the defendant revealed the 
marijuana unsolicited or dropped the marijuana onto the ground 
as the officer approached.200 In some instances, police officers 
may deliberately conduct stop-and-frisks or searches without 
independent witnesses nearby to isolate themselves from 
evidence of potential wrongdoing.201  
This phenomenon creates particular difficulty for an MPV 
defendant. Anecdotal reports suggest that in a credibility contest 
between an MPV defendant—an individual who may or may not 
have an existing criminal record—and a police officer, the 
officer is usually judged to be the more credible witness.202 This 
stems from two inherent biases. First, legal scholars have 
demonstrated that race plays a significant role in fact-finders’ 
credibility determinations.203 As most MPV defendants are black 
or Latino,204 a jury may be less likely to find their testimony 
credible, particularly when the juror is of a different race than 
the defendant.205 This phenomenon is also found in the decisions 
made by trial judges.206 Therefore, some fact-finders may 
                                                          
199 LEVINE & SMALL, supra note 1, at 31.  
200 Id. at 43–44. The phenomenon of “dropsy” arrests has been part of 
NYPD narcotics policing since the aggressive crack cocaine enforcement of 
the 1980s. Id. 
201 Id. at 31. 
202 Id. at 27. 
203 See Sheri Lynn Johnson, The Color of Truth: Race and the 
Assessment of Credibility, 1 MICH. J. RACE & L. 261, 312–317 (1996) 
(describing the psychology of how race and racism impacts credibility 
determinations). See generally Joseph W. Rand, The Demeanor Gap: Race, 
Lie Detection, and the Jury, 33 CONN. L. REV. 1 (2000) (analyzing how race 
affects juries’ abilities to perform cross-racial credibility determinations). 
204 See Documenting 10 Years of Marijuana Possession Arrests Under 
Mayor Bloomberg, supra note 80. 
205 See generally Rand, supra note 203.  
206 See Jeffrey J. Rachlinski et al., Does Unconscious Racial Bias Affect 
Trial Judges?, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1195, 1221 (2009) (concluding that 
judges carry implicit racial biases which can affect their judgment, but that 
judges can suppress their biases when aware of a need to do so). 
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prejudge an MPV defendant independent of the strength of his 
or her testimony. Second, there exists a perception among fact-
finders that a testifying police officer “will testify with an 
official imprimatur of sorts, since he testifies subject to two 
oaths—the oath sworn as a witness to tell the whole truth, and 
the oath he takes as a police officer to serve, protect, and defend 
the public and the law.”207  
However, the presumption of credibility may not always be a 
sound one. Although not exclusive to the MPV arrest context, 
the problem of “testilying”—police officers fabricating testimony 
of the arrests they make to cover up misconduct—plagues the 
NYPD and police departments across the country.208 In 1994, the 
Mollen Commission released its report on police corruption in 
New York City following a twenty-two-month investigation and 
found police corruption to be a “serious problem” in New York 
City.209 In particular, it found police perjury and falsification to 
be “probably the most common form of corruption facing the 
criminal justice system, particularly in connection with arrests 
for narcotics and guns.”210 Despite nearly two decades’ passage 
since the Mollen Commission issued its report, the NYPD 
continues to struggle with misconduct,211 particularly in the 
context of arrest quotas212 and narcotics arrests.213  
                                                          
207 David N. Dorfman, Proving the Lie: Litigating Police Credibility, 26 
AM. J. CRIM. L. 455, 500 (1999). 
208 See, e.g., I. Bennett Capers, Crime, Legitimacy, and Testilying, 83 
IND. L.J. 835, 868 (2008) (“[B]lue lies have existed as long as there have 
been restraints on police activity.”); Morgan Cloud, The Dirty Little Secret, 
43 EMORY L.J. 1331 (1994) (detailing the phenomenon of police perjury in 
the search and seizure context and advocating an interpretive theory of the 
Fourth Amendment to encourage judges to more rigorously evaluate police 
officers’ testimony); Christopher Slobogin, Testilying: Police Perjury and 
What to Do About It, 67 U. COLO. L. REV. 1037 (1996) (describing the 
nature and causes of testilying and advancing various proposals to decrease 
it). 
209 COMM’N TO INVESTIGATE ALLEGATIONS OF POLICE CORRUPTION & 
THE ANTI-CORRUPTION PROCEDURES OF THE POLICE DEP’T, CITY OF N.Y., 
COMMISSION REPORT 1 (1994) [hereinafter MOLLEN COMMISSION REPORT].  
210 Id. at 36. For a fuller discussion of “testilying” within the NYPD, see 
id. at 36–43.  
211 While by its nature “testilying” is difficult to detect on a mass scale, 
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The ability of courts to consider an individual’s 
predisposition to commit a crime further exacerbates the issue of 
wrongful arrests. New York State’s entrapment law follows the 
Supreme Court’s subjective test established in Sorrells v. United 
States,214 which allows the court to consider whether that 
particular defendant was “otherwise disposed to commit [the 
crime],”215 and the defendant’s criminal history.216 Between 1996 
and 2010, the NYPD made nearly 540,000 marijuana possession 
                                                          
there are indications that it remains a not infrequent occurrence. See, e.g., 
Press Release, N.Y. Cnty. Dist. Att’y’s Office, District Attorney Vance 
Announces Guilty Verdict in Police Perjury Trial (Mar. 8, 2012), available 
at http://manhattanda.org/press-release/district-attorney-vance-announces-
guilty-verdict-police-perjury-trial; Murray Weiss, Dozens of NYPD Officers 
Investigated for Perjury, DNAINFO.COM (last updated Aug. 17, 2011, 6:47 
AM), http://www.dnainfo.com/new-york/20110817/manhattan/dozens-of-
nypd-officers-investigated-for-perjury (reporting “at least three dozen cops” 
under investigation by NYPD Internal Affairs Bureau and district attorneys 
related to alleged perjury relating to circumstances of arrests and how 
evidence was seized in criminal cases including drug busts and a murder). 
212 Rayman, NYPD Quotas, supra note 58 (“Key testimony in the case 
came from Capt. Alex Perez, who told jurors that indeed arrest quotas were 
key in judging cops’ productivity.”); Rayman, NYPD Tapes, supra note 59 
(“From the tapes, it’s not hard to imagine an officer desperately driving to 
the precinct, looking for someone smoking pot on a stoop or double-parking 
to fill some gap in their productivity.”). 
213 John Marzulli, Bad Busts Cost City $1.2M in Settlements for NYPD’s 
False Drug-Arrest Lawsuits, N.Y. DAILY NEWS (Oct. 16, 2011), http://www. 
nydailynews.com/news/crime/bad-busts-cost-city-1-2m-settlements-nypd-false-
drug-arrest-lawsuits-article-1.965581 (“Nearly 300 drug arrests had to be 
tossed in Brooklyn and Queens, most of them made by Brooklyn South narcs 
tainted by their false testimony and shredded credibility.”); Stephen Anderson 
Admits to Issuing Fake Drug Charges to Meet Quotas, HUFFINGTON POST 
(Oct. 13, 2011, 12:44 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/10/13/ 
stephen-anderson-admits-t_n_1008831.html (“[NYPD Officer] Stephen 
Anderson testified under a cooperation deal with prosecutors that it was 
common for officers to frame innocent people on drug busts, a practice 
known as ‘flaking.’”). 
214 Sorrells v. United States, 287 U.S. 435, 451–52 (1932). 
215 N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 40.05 (McKinney 2009). 
216 People v. Calvano, 30 N.Y.2d 199, 204 (1972) (“[P]roof of the 
criminal disposition of a defendant claiming entrapment is relevant 
generally . . . .”). 
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arrests, some of which are likely to have been improper 
according to the evidence and analysis here. This leaves a long 
trail of wrongful MPV convictions on criminal records for those 
who did not receive an ACD or failed to complete the 
probationary period successfully.217 Thus the hurdles compound 
onto themselves; NYPD marijuana enforcement practices 
themselves make it more difficult to make a successful 
entrapment argument for some MPV defendants.218 
Acknowledging that many MPV arrests are conducted 
properly and stem from situations involving actual possession or 
smoking in view of the public,219 many arrestees still face 
wrongful arrests with scant opportunity to demonstrate their 
innocence or to seek justice in court for police misconduct. This 
reality erodes the credibility of the criminal justice system, 
builds distrust between communities and police officers,220 and 
ultimately upends the democratic promises of the judiciary. 
                                                          
217 Levine Testimony, supra note 42, at 33–34. 
218 One criminal defense attorney at a legal services organization in 
Brooklyn informally estimates that approximately two-thirds of MPV 
defendants represented by his office have faced arrest under section 221.10(1) 
in the past. E-mail from Josh Saunders, Trial Att’y, Brooklyn Defender 
Servs., to author (Dec. 1, 2011, 13:24 EST) (on file with author).  
219 Estimates vary as to how many MPV arrestees were actually 
possessing or smoking marijuana in view of the public. See, e.g., Johnson et 
al., supra note 105, at 903 (“[N]early half [of those surveyed] reported 
smoking in public locations.”); LEVINE & SMALL, supra note 1, at 39 
(“Approximately two-thirds to three-quarters of those arrested for marijuana 
possession were not smoking and most were not displaying the marijuana.”); 
Interview with Scott Levy, Attorney, Marijuana Arrest Project, The Bronx 
Defenders (Nov. 11, 2011) (on file with author) (reporting his estimate that 
approximately fifty percent of marijuana arrests are people actually smoking 
in public). 
220 Bill Perkins, Political and Community Leaders Speak Out, N.Y. CIVIL 
LIBERTIES UNION, http://www.nyclu.org/node/1738 (last visited Nov. 3, 
2011) (“By funneling the NYPD’s limited resources into those unfair and 
unwise tactics, serious crime in the city goes unchecked and residents become 
increasingly distrustful of those who have been sworn to protect them.”). 
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V. POLICY ALTERNATIVES 
As evidenced by the foregoing analysis, arrestees charged 
under section 221.10(1) face multiple challenges. Although 
many lack the predisposition for the MPV offense and would not 
have exposed marijuana but for the inducement of a police 
officer, they face daunting odds in reaching trial and making 
entrapment arguments in court. Altering the culture and 
processes of a criminal justice system with embedded roles for 
the police, courts, prosecutors, and defense attorneys is hardly a 
simple task, but policymakers and institutional players can look 
to alternatives to the current system to guard against improper 
arrests and convictions in MPV cases. There are a number of 
potential policy responses and strategies for reducing and 
defending against improper MPV arrests. While each has its 
merits, the most sustainable solution is a change in state 
marijuana law to eliminate the MPV offense entirely. 
A. The Kelly Memorandum: Insufficiency of NYPD Policy 
Memoranda 
On September 19, 2011, NYPD Commissioner Ray Kelly 
issued a memorandum to all NYPD commands providing the first 
acknowledgment by the NYPD that the Department’s marijuana 
enforcement practices may have been improper for years.221 Yet the 
evidence gathered thus far suggests that the Commissioner’s order 
has not had a measurable effect on the number of improper 
marijuana arrests.222 
While the binding language in the order specifically instructs 
officers that directing an individual to bring marijuana into 
public view does not create an MPV offense,223 it does not 
appear to have translated into on-the-ground changes in 
enforcement practices.224  
                                                          
221 2011 KELLY MEMO, supra note 16. 
222 See, e.g., Brennan & Devereaux, supra note 20 (“[T]he number of 
those arrested increased after the order was made.”). 
223 2011 KELLY MEMO, supra note 16. 
224 See Peltz, supra note 13 (reporting higher annual low-level marijuana 
arrests in 2011 than in 2010). Estimates as to the number of MPV arrests that 
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Despite the hopeful tone of many advocates when 
Commissioner Kelly issued the order, there are two central 
reasons to be skeptical about the Kelly memorandum’s capacity 
to effect a lasting policy shift. First, NYPD policy has not 
always historically been reflected in the day-to-day operations of 
the Department. One need not look much further than the 
Mollen Commission’s description of the internal collapse of the 
NYPD’s anti-corruption structures to see that there is little 
incentive to aggressively follow a policy to which strict 
adherence would reveal officers’ wrongdoing or misconduct.225 
With criticism of the NYPD’s self-policing mechanisms still 
prominent, it remains unclear what capacity or will exists within 
the Department to ensure that the Kelly memorandum is 
aggressively enforced.226 Policing culture remains centered on 
productivity statistics, database-building, and, in many cases, 
securing overtime pay; thus, shifting officers away from tens of 
                                                          
are not the result of actual public smoking or possession range from one-half 
to three-quarters. See Johnson et al., supra note 105, at 903; LEVINE & 
SMALL, supra note 1, at 39; Interview with Scott Levy, supra note 219. 
225 See MOLLEN COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 209, at 71 (“The 
reason for this collapse can be summarized in a few words: a deep-seated 
institutional reluctance to uncover serious corruption with no independent 
external pressure to counter it. . . . From the top brass down, there was a 
widespread belief that uncovering serious corruption would harm careers and 
the Department’s reputation . . . . [A]voiding bad headlines, and tolerating 
corruption, became more important than eradicating it.”). 
226 See, e.g., Brennan & Devereaux, supra note 20 (“[Bronx Defenders 
attorney Scott Levy, after The Bronx Defenders released study showing 
improper arrests continued to be high following Commissioner Kelly’s 
order:] ‘This is clearly an illegal practice. And the fact that it hasn’t stopped 
since Commissioner Kelly issued his memo, suggests there is a deep 
disconnect between what happens on the street and what the top brass in the 
NYPD are saying happens.’”); William K. Rashbaum et al., Experts Say 
N.Y. Police Dept. Isn’t Policing Itself, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 2, 2011), 
http://www.nytimes. 
com/2011/11/03/nyregion/experts-say-ny-police-dept-isnt-policing-itself.html 
(“This spate of unrelated corruption prosecutions, and what some see as the 
Internal Affairs Bureau’s spotty record uncovering major cases involving 
crooked officers, raise questions about the department’s ability to police 
itself, said nearly a dozen current and former prosecutors who have handled 
corruption cases, as well as some current and former Internal Affairs 
supervisors and investigators.”). 
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thousands of easy arrests each year may prove a difficult task 
for the NYPD.227 
Second, continued enforcement of a commissioner’s 
operations order is subject to the will of whomever the current 
commissioner is.228 As mayoral administrations and NYPD 
leadership change, operations orders can change as well. Leaving 
marijuana arrest tactics to the discretion of future NYPD 
commissioners and mayors is an unstable solution, as future 
administrations may not adhere to Commissioner Kelly’s 
operations order in the long term. 
B. Damn the Torpedoes: Go For Entrapment 
While defense attorneys are undeniably overburdened with 
cases and many lack the requisite resources to develop a 
sufficient evidentiary record to make a successful entrapment 
defense in a low-level misdemeanor case,229 the criminal defense 
bar should encourage more attorneys to do so, even if on a 
limited or test-case basis. A defense attorney is ethically 
obligated to represent the interests of her client230 and, 
                                                          
227 See Monique Marks, Transforming Police Organizations from Within, 
40 BRIT. J. CRIMINOLOGY 557, 558 (2000) (“[T]ransforming police 
organizations has proven extremely difficult given their conservative nature 
and general resilience to change . . . .”). 
228 N.Y.C. CHARTER & ADMIN. CODE ANN. ch. 18, § 434(a)–(b) (N.Y. 
Legal Publ’g Corp. 2001 & Supp. 2011). 
229 COMM’N ON THE FUTURE OF INDIGENT DEF. SERVS., FINAL REPORT 
TO THE CHIEF JUDGE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK 17 (2006), available at 
http://www.courts.state.ny.us/ip/indigentdefense-commission/IndigentDefense 
Commission_report06.pdf (“Testimony at the Commission’s hearings was 
replete with descriptions by defenders of their inability to provide effective 
representation due to a lack of resources. This lack of resources (a) results in 
excessive caseloads; (b) impedes the ability of many institutional providers to 
hire full-time defenders; (c) deprives defense providers of adequate access to 
investigators, social workers, interpreters and other support services; (d) is 
largely responsible for inadequate or non-existent training programs; and (e) 
contributes to defense providers having only minimal contact with clients and 
their families.”). 
230 MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.2 (2011) (“[A] lawyer shall 
abide by a client’s decisions concerning the objectives of representation and 
. . . shall consult with the client as to the means by which they are to be 
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admittedly, for many clients this may mean a quick resolution. 
But among the tens of thousands of MPV arrestees each year, 
there are likely to be a number who would be interested in 
proving their innocence in court.231 Even attempting to push a 
handful of such cases through the court system in each New 
York City borough could: (1) vindicate the rights of defendants; 
(2) educate prosecutors, judges, other defense attorneys, and the 
police about the legal and ethical murkiness surrounding MPV 
arrests; and (3) compel the justice system to function more 
fairly.232 
Increased litigation would also draw media attention. 
Because there are so few reported entrapment cases in New 
York State each year,233 with appropriate media outreach, even 
an unsuccessful entrapment argument might raise the profile of 
questionable police practices. Such media attention would, in 
turn, put pressure on the accountable political branches to 
reevaluate the wisdom and appropriateness of the NYPD’s 
marijuana enforcement practices.234  
                                                          
pursued. . . . In a criminal case, the lawyer shall abide by the client’s 
decision, after consultation with the lawyer, as to a plea to be 
entered . . . .”). 
231 See Cleary Gottlieb Partners with the Bronx Defenders on Stop and 
Frisk Project, CLEARY GOTTLIEB STEEN & HAMILTON LLP (Feb. 1, 2012), 
http://www.cgsh.com/cleary_gottlieb_partners_with_the_bronx_defenders_on_
stop_and_frisk_project/ (describing Cleary Gottlieb’s partnership with The 
Bronx Defenders to “represent persons arrested for low-level marijuana 
possession in an effort to challenge the policing conduct that generates these 
needless, costly and often harmful contacts with the criminal justice system”).  
232 See Michelle Alexander, Op-Ed., Go to Trial: Crash the Justice 
System, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 10, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/03/11/ 
opinion/sunday/go-to-trial-crash-the-justice-system.html (arguing that if a 
sufficient number of people charged with crimes suddenly exercised their 
constitutional rights, the “ensuing chaos would force mass incarceration to 
the top of the agenda for politicians and policymakers, leaving them only two 
viable options: sharply scale back the number of criminal cases filed (for 
drug possession, for example) or amend the Constitution”). 
233 See Stevenson, supra note 122, at 24–25 (describing the number of 
entrapment cases in New York State each year as “paltry,” with no more 
than a handful of reported cases in the early 2000s). 
234 Research has demonstrated that media attention and presentation of a 
social problem can compel government decision makers to change their minds 
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C. Change Within the Courts 
As a general matter, all institutional participants in New 
York’s criminal justice system must take proactive responsibility 
to protect the integrity of the courts. A number of commentators 
have suggested steps prosecutors, defense attorneys, and judges 
could take to make the adjudication of low-level misdemeanors 
like MPV more just.235 For example, to deemphasize the primacy 
put on efficiency at the expense of justice, some have suggested 
the criminal courts expand their hours, including building in 
additional parts on nights and weekends, and increase calendar 
flexibility.236 Others have recommended that judges require 
prosecutors to call arresting officers as witnesses in suppression 
hearings and reject more plea agreements that don’t serve the 
ends of justice.237 The apparent inability of MPV arrestees to 
                                                          
about an “issue’s importance, their belief that policy action was necessary, 
and their perception of the public’s view of issue importance.” Fay Lomax 
Cook et al., Media and Agenda Setting: Effects on the Public, Interest Group 
Leaders, Policy Makers, and Policy, 47 PUB. OPINION Q. 16, 28 (1983). 
235 See, e.g., Howell, supra note 79, at 322–23 (arguing prosecutors 
should be educated about collateral consequences of misdemeanor convictions 
and exercise more discretion not to prosecute in appropriate cases, and 
defense attorneys should reject certain “standard offer[]” pleas that are not in 
the interest of their clients); Zeidman, supra note 159, at 332–38, 351 
(arguing prosecutors should scrutinize police testimony and practices more 
closely). There do appear to be some signs of hope on the landscape. Some 
prosecutors have reported an increasing skepticism of MPV arrests. See Ari 
Paul, Prosecutors Grapple with Marijuana Arrests, GOTHAM GAZETTE (Mar. 
2011), http://www.gothamgazette.com/article/health/20110329/9/3500 
(“[Staten Island District Attorney Dan Donovan] said many people caught on 
misdemeanor drug offenses are brought in under questionable 
circumstances—like through a stop-and-frisk, which forces individuals to 
empty their pockets . . . . Donovan said that in those instances, prosecutors 
can move not to press the case. ‘We’ve got real smart with that,’ he said.”). 
236 See, e.g., Howell, supra note 79, at 323 (recommending the 
establishment of nights and weekend parts for working defendants); Martha 
Rayner, Conference Report: New York City’s Criminal Courts: Are We 
Achieving Justice?, 31 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1023, 1034–36 (2004) (making 
recommendations to increase efficiency of the Criminal Court, improve court 
facilities, increase information to defendants, and expand court hours and 
calendar flexibility, among other improvements).  
237 See Howell, supra note 79, at 323 (recommending that in rejecting 
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reach a hearing on the merits and argue entrapment in the face 
of significant police misconduct is not simply a crisis in the 
marijuana arrest context—the adjudication of misdemeanors as a 
whole in New York City is in crisis. Without any particularly 
effective, independent oversight of the NYPD,238 much of the 
burden falls on the courts and its constituent participants to work 
to achieve justice for the thousands who move through the 
system each year.  The causes are complex and there is plenty of 
blame to spread, but the courts do not shed their duty to ensure 
justice in the face of systemic collapse. Judges, prosecutors, and 
defense attorneys must work creatively and deliberately to take 
intermediate steps to retain the public’s faith in the integrity of the 
courts. 
D. The Decriminalization Approach: Eliminating the MPV 
Misdemeanor 
Rather than attempt to alter the incentives of various players 
in the criminal justice system, a more sustainable approach 
would be to change state laws regulating marijuana. The bulk of 
New York State’s marijuana laws have been intact since the 
decriminalization regime passed in 1977 established an 
independent section in the Penal Code for marijuana offenses.239  
In response to the dramatic increase of arrests under section 
221.10(1), Republican State Senator Mark Grisanti and 
Democratic State Assemblyman Hakeem Jeffries introduced 
legislation in 2011 to standardize the penalties for marijuana 
possession—effectively eliminating the “in view of the public” 
offense and making all marijuana possession below 25 grams, 
                                                          
plea agreements judges broaden the scope of what does not serve justice to 
include collateral consequence calculations); Zeidman, supra note 159, at 334 
(calling for judges to require prosecutors to call as witnesses officers most 
directly involved in an arrest). 
238 See ROBERT A. PERRY, N.Y. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, MISSION FAILURE: 
CIVILIAN REVIEW OF POLICING IN NEW YORK CITY 1994–2006, at 1–8 (2007), 
available at http://www.nyclu.org/files/publications/nyclu_pub_mission_failure.pdf 
(concluding that New York City’s civilian review of policing is a failure). 
239 LEVINE & SMALL, supra note 1, at 38.  
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whether in public or in private, a violation.240 The bill would 
extend the decriminalization approach of the 1977 statutory 
framework to possession or smoking in public by making such 
offenses violations rather than misdemeanors and therefore 
removing some of the incentives for police misconduct.241 
Furthermore, amending the marijuana statutory framework is 
more likely to ensure that changes in mayoral or police 
leadership will not result in a reversion to a high number of 
aggressive and improper MPV arrests.242 New York City mayors 
do have considerable influence on the state legislative process 
but do not always succeed in passing their favored bills through 
the state legislature.243 While such legislation would not prohibit 
officers from looking elsewhere in the penal code for ways to 
replace their lost MPV arrest numbers,244 it would be effective in 
cutting down on the number of improper marijuana arrests each 
year.245 
                                                          
240 S. 5187, 2011 Leg., Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 2011), available at 
http://open.nysenate.gov/legislation/bill/S5187-2011.  
241 Id.  
242 N.Y. PENAL LAW § 221.10 (McKinney 2008). There have not been 
substantial changes to the marijuana laws in thirty-five years. According to 
Levine & Small, the structure of the original Marijuana Reform Act of 1977 
was the same as the law is today: possession of up to twenty-five grams of 
marijuana is a violation under New York State law. LEVINE & SMALL, supra 
note 1, at 60. 
243 David King, Rural Legislator, City Issue: How Upstaters Decide, 
GOTHAM GAZETTE (Mar. 2, 2009 12:00 AM), http://www.gothamgazette. 
com/index.php/archives/148-rural-legislator-city-issue-how-upstaters-decide 
(“[Gene Russianoff of the Straphangers Campaign:] ‘The Tom and Jerry 
relationship between the state legislature and the mayor dates back centuries. 
There has always been this tension. One level of government always has it in 
for another level.’”). 
244 Steven Thrasher, Harry Levine of Marijuana-Arrests.com: “We Are 
Always Encouraged When the Police Decide to Obey the Law,” RUNNIN’ 
SCARED (Sept. 26, 2011, 8:30 AM), http://blogs.villagevoice.com/ 
runninscared/2011/09/harry_levine_nypd_marijuana.php (“The NYPD will 
likely try to make up the loss of these marijuana arrests by charging even 
more people with disorderly conduct, trespassing, resisting arrest and other 
crimes that do not require evidence.”). 
245 Broader changes to state law could also go far in changing police 
behavior as it pertains to improper MPV arrests. These could include: (1) 
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In June 2012, the Grisanti-Jeffries legislation was superseded 
by New York Governor Andrew Cuomo’s proposal to reduce 
the possession of twenty-five grams or less of marijuana in view 
of the public from a misdemeanor to a violation but to continue 
enforcement of public marijuana smoking as a misdemeanor.246 
The Governor’s support for the legislation surprised advocates 
who had been pushing for such reforms,247 and appeared destined 
for passage with the announced support of New York City 
Mayor Michael Bloomberg, New York City Police 
Commissioner Ray Kelly, and all five of the New York City 
district attorneys.248 Ultimately, however, the proposal was 
sidelined when the Republican-controlled New York State Senate 
declined to bring it to a vote.249 
                                                          
restrictions on stop-and-frisk procedures that would decrease the number of 
individuals searched and questioned by the NYPD for all offenses and (2) 
greater appropriations for the court system as a whole, and most particularly, 
indigent defense services, to reduce the assembly-line-like process for 
adjudicating misdemeanors and give defense attorneys an opportunity to more 
fully interview their clients, identify appropriate defenses, and develop 
evidentiary records to use at trial, among other procedural changes.  
246 Kaplan, supra note 45. Based on 2011 arrest data provided by the 
New York State Division of Criminal Justice Services (“DCJS”) to the 
author, there is no way to definitively determine what effect the Governor’s 
proposal to maintain a misdemeanor offense for public smoking would have 
on arrest numbers because such arrests are not identified in DCJS data. See 
E-mail from N.Y. State Div. of Criminal Justice Servs., supra note 10. 
However, see supra note 105 for further discussion on public marijuana 
smoking. 
247 Alisa Chang, The Evolution of Cuomo’s Push to Lower Pot Arrests 
(WNYC radio broadcast June 5, 2012), available at http://www.wnyc.org/ 
articles/wnyc-news/2012/jun/05/evolution-cuomos-push-lower-pot-arrests/. 
248 Alisa Chang, Political Pressure Caused Cuomo’s Pot Plan to Go Up in 
Smoke, WNYC EMPIRE BLOG (June 19, 2012, 3:54 PM), 
http://www.wnyc.org/ 
blogs/empire/2012/jun/19/cuomo-says-action-plan-cut-pot-arrests-highly-unlikely/. 
249 Thomas Kaplan & John Elgion, Divide in Albany Kills Proposal on 
Marijuana, N.Y. TIMES (June 20, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/06/ 
20/nyregion/cuomo-bill-on-marijuana-doomed-by-republican-opposition.html. 
In his stated opposition to the proposal, New York State Senate majority 
leader Dean Skelos alluded to the image of someone walking around with 
“ten joints in each ear” facing only a violation. Thomas Kaplan, G.O.P. 
Senators Oppose Cuomo’s Marijuana Plan, N.Y. TIMES (June 7, 2012), 
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Although the legislation did not pass the legislature in 2012, 
the non-traditional political support for the proposal from law 
enforcement entities such as the police commissioner and district 
attorneys is encouraging and indicates that the legislative change 
cannot be ruled out.250 While it remains to be seen whether New 
York State’s statute will change, such a development would 
make the most significant and sustainable impact on decreasing 
improper marijuana arrests in New York City. 
CONCLUSION 
While recent directives by NYPD leadership to avoid 
improper MPV arrests may prove fruitful, the unavailability of 
possibly meritorious entrapment defenses to thousands of 
defendants in New York City will remain an outstanding 
problem. The State Legislature can and should act to expand the 
decriminalization framework of the existing New York State 
marijuana laws and eliminate the incentives behind improper 
arrests. However, until policymakers and the gatekeepers of 
New York City’s criminal justice system take responsibility for 
a broken system, defendants will be left with limited options to 
challenge illegitimate MPV arrests. 
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250 See Chang, supra note 21 (discussing support of Cuomo, Kelly, and 
New York County District Attorney Cyrus Vance). 
